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The proposal that the information contained in a traumatic event can be 
differentially processed and that maladaptive processing will result in the 
signs and symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is the basis of 
current information processing theories of the disorder. This thesis proposes 
that in order for information processing theories of PTSD to account for the 
current research findings into the processing of traumatic information they 
need to consider the nature and structure of peoples' memories for 
personally significant events (Autobiographical Memories), and by doing so, 
it is hoped to demonstrate the utility of memory processes for understanding 
the development and maintenance of PTSD. Chapter One considers the 
diagnosis and symptoms of PTSD and focuses on the current research into 
PTSD and memory. Recent experiments have found that people with PTSD 
attend to threat-relevant information in a biased manner, which is possibly 
determined by the current (life-goal) concerns for that individual. Such 
attentional biases interfere with a persons ability to perform other cognitive 
tasks and may be the basis for the re-experiencing of traumatic events which 
is a central symptom of PTSD. As well PTSD patients are characterised by 
an overgeneral memory for other non-traumatic events. An inability to recall 
non-traumatic memories may be partially responsible for the maintenance of 
the disorder and it has been suggested by researchers that overgeneral 
memory is related to emotional numbing in PTSD (another primary symptom 
of the disorder). Chapter Two evaluates information processing theories of 
PTSD in terms of how they account for memory processes. The main finding 
of this evaluation is that while information processing theories implicitly 
implicate memory processes and structures they do not explicitly attempt to 
account for them. Chapter Three considers the current findings of theory 
and research into the organisation and structure of Autobiographical Memory 
and the ways in which these factors are represented in information 
processing and in the processing of information from traumatic events in 
particular. This study concludes that motivations, emotions, and self-
concepts are used to encode, store and retrieve information about personally 
significant events and are central to the processing variables involved in 
PTSD. These variables are evidenced through the research into PTSD and 
memory and by the work on the organisation and structure of 
autobiographical memory. Lastly areas for future research and theory are 
identified. 
In silence. Memory is strong 
T. S. Eliot 
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CHAPTER ONE 
POST TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER 
Introduction 
While people have observed the psychological effects of trauma for 
hundreds of years, it was not until 1980 that these effects were classified as 
a diagnosable disorder. This collection of symptoms was termed Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) in the DSM-Ill (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1980), where a number of primary diagnostic criteria were 
identified. Since 1980 the increase in the amount of research and theory in 
this area has led to a better understanding and refinement of etiology, 
diagnosis and related issues. As an understanding of these areas is crucial 
for a through evaluation of theory, symptoms and related issues will be 
reviewed in the following chapter. 
Diagnostic Criteria 
From the first official classification of PTSD in 1980 there have been two 
successive updates, the DSM-111-R in 1987 and the DSM-IV in 1994. The 
DSM-IV identifies six clusters of symptoms and criterion, all of which must be 
present for the diagnosis of PTSD to be given. These criterion are: (i) the 
experience of a traumatic event; (2) re-experiencing of the event; (3) 
avoidance of reminders of the event and numbing of general 
responsiveness; (4) increased arousal; (5) a specified duration of 
responding, and (6) impairment to other areas of functioning. 
The Traumatic Stressor 
It should come as no surprise that the first criterion for the diagnosis of 
PTSD is the experience of a traumatic event. To meet this criterion in the 
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DSM-111-R a person must have "experienced an event that is outside the 
range of normal human experience and that would be markedly distressing 
to almost anyone". In the DSM-IV this criterion has been dropped so that the 
traumatic event no longer has to be outside the range of normal human 
experience. This reflects the belief that the events which can lead to PTSD 
are not as unusual as was once thought. In some instances they are merely 
shocking and uncommon experiences for an individual who is undergoing 
them for the first time. The alteration in the criterion also implies that PTSD 
involves a pathological response to a traumatic experience rather than a 
normal or adaptive reaction to an overwhelming experience. 
In the DSM-IV exposure to the traumatic event must have involved 
experiencing, witnessing or being confronted with a situation where there 
was an actual or perceived threat to ones life or limb, or to the "physical 
integrity" of ones self or that of others. From the DSM-111-R to the DSM-IV an 
increasing emphasis is placed on threat. The importance of peoples' 
perceptions of trauma will be taken up when we consider theories of PTSD. 
The remaining symptoms of PTSD can be summarised into three 
categories: intrusion, avoidance, and hyper-arousal. 
Intrusion 
This group of criterion is arguably the most important because they 
clearly differentiate PTSD from other psychological disorders (Creamer, 
1993). Re-experiencing the traumatic event can take a number of different 
forms such as intrusive memories of the event (images, thoughts and/or 
perceptions); dreams or nightmares that involve facets of the event; acting or 
feeling as if the event were recurring, or intense psychological distress when 
reminded of the event. Psychological distress can be initiated by either 
external cues (smells, sounds, surroundings similar to those involved in the 
traumatic event) or internal cues (such as cognitions or high physiological 
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arousal). Lastly there may be a physiological reaction when exposed to 
situations that remind one of the event. 
Peterson, Prout, and Schwarz (1991) argue that it is not surprising that 
one of the hallmarks of PTSD is the re-experiencing of trauma. They refer to 
Epstein (1990) who proposed that the re-experiencing of trauma has an 
adaptive value. The 11 experience 11 of a trauma can be overwhelming, and the 
re-experiencing of symptoms uncomfortable because of the emotions, 
feelings and thoughts that they produce. However, in order to consider the 
full implications of an event it must be re-examined. An individual cannot re-
examine an event without first calling it into consciousness in some form. 
Only by doing this can alternate beliefs, behaviours and assumptions be 
considered. 
Thus it is argued by some that the occurrence of intrusive thoughts is not 
in itself pathological. Rather it is the attempt to prevent this process, through 
avoidance behaviours that results in pathological reactions. By avoiding 
reminders of the trauma one does not bring about healthy resolution. The 
traumatic material has simply been shunted out of consciousness. 
When someone is able to talk through their feelings about what occurred, 
when they can find meaning in the event, then they are more likely to come 
to an "adaptive resolution". The intrusive material tends to stop only when 
there remains nothing left to learn from it (Epstein, 1990). 
Avoidance and Emotional Numbing 
Re-experiencing parts of the traumatic event can be highly disturbing. 
This results in the individual avoiding reminders of the event and sometimes 
in withdrawing from the world. 
Symptoms in this cluster include avoidance of conversations, thoughts 
and feelings associated with the trauma. Avoidance can also take the form 
of evading activities, places or people who remind one of the event. The 
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typical course of PTSD includes repeated phases of intrusive and avoidance 
symptoms. 
Numbing of responsiveness can be observed as a diminished interest in 
previously significant activities, feeling detached or estranged from others, a 
restricted range of affect, and the feeling or belief that one's future is 
foreshortened. 
Another common symptom is memory loss. This manifests as an 
inability to account for periods of time or an inability to recall certain aspects 
of the trauma. These symptoms are seen as signs of avoidance behaviour. 
MEMORY AND TRAUMA 
There are few studies that directly investigate memory for trauma-related 
information even though re-experiencing stems from the memories of 
traumatic events. However, recently several studies have been conducted 
which have attempted to investigate this area. 
Zeitlan and McNally (1991) tested explicit and implicit memory biases for 
threat-related information using the stroop color-naming task. The objective 
of these studies is to determine how traumatic information is represented in 
memory and how the representations of PTSD patients differ from those 
people without PTSD. The subjects of the study included Vietnam veterans 
with and without a diagnosis of PTSD. The researchers found that PTSD is 
not associated with a retrieval deficit for threat-related information. In fact 
PTSD patients do not (or cannot) engage in avoidance on explicit memory 
tasks. They also found poor overall memory for information not related to the 
trauma. This concurs with clinical observations of PTSD. Patients often 
present with problems in concentration and memory in general, but show no 
problem in recalling the details of the traumatic event. Zeitlan and McNally 
propose that this is the result of chronic processing of threat information 
which prevents the processing of other memories. 
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The subjects with PTSD also showed an implicit memory deficit for 
combat words (a form of threat-relevant information) which was significantly 
related to the severity of the disorder. This result implies that PTSD is 
characterised by threat representations which are highly elaborated and 
readily activated. Such representations are seen in other anxiety disorders, 
generalised anxiety disorder in particular, however a comparison of GAD and 
PTSD implies that this threat representation is only chronically activated in 
PTSD. 
From this study Zeitlan and McNally conclude that information about 
trauma may be represented differently in the memory of combat veterans 
with and without PTSD. The nature of this representation makes traumatic 
memories chronically activated and readily accessible. They explain that this 
is a form of implicit memory which results from the activation of a cognitive 
representation which strengthens the internal structure (integration) of the 
memory. This enhances its accessibility but does not necessarily make it 
more retrievable. These processes (activation and integration) are relatively 
automatic and occur independently from the amount of elaboration that 
occurs at encoding (explicit memory) (Graf, & Schacter, 1985). Thus the 
attentional bias for threat-related information is the result of automatic rather 
than controlled information processing. This study indicates that cognitive 
representations of the traumatic event reside in a primed or partially 
activated state in memory. Because these "memories" are readily 
accessible, they could account for the involuntary re-experiencing symptoms 
found in PTSD, such as flashbacks and intrusive thoughts (Zeitlan and 
McNally, 1991). 
This memory bias has also been observed in rape victims with PTSD 
(Foa, Feske, Murdock, Kozak, & McCarthy, 1991; Cassiday, McNally, & 
Zeitlan, 1992). Cassiday et al (1992) note that PTSD subjects show greater 
interference in the stroop color-naming test for positive words than for neutral 
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words. This implies that anxiety disordered individuals selectively process 
any emotional information and not just that which is related to threat. 
The question remains why do anxious patients, and PTSD patients in 
particular, exhibit attentional biases to certain forms of information? On the 
one hand it could be related to the emotionality of the words (Martin, 
Williams, & Clark, 1991 ). On the other hand and as Klinger (1975) proposes, 
selective attention may be determined by an individual's current concerns. 
This means that cognitive-affective motivational states related to one's 
current goals (positive and negative) become activated and remain so until 
either the goal is reached or one stops pursuing it. The activation of such 
motivational states interferes with performance on other cognitive tasks. 
Thus an attentional bias would be expected to occur with both positive 
and negative words in the stroop color-naming task if these words were 
indicators of a person's current concerns. Likewise one could expect 
attentional biases in non-anxious as well as anxious populations if the words 
in the Stroop color-naming task were related to these individual's current 
concerns. In fact a recent study by Riemann & McNally (1995} has found 
just that. Non-anxious subjects showed attentional biases to positive and 
negative information when the material in the task was highly personally 
relevant. These results indicate that there are cognitive constructs in the 
mind/brain which are chronically accessible (because they are related to 
current concerns for the individual) and which interfere with performance on 
other cognitive tasks. In the case of people with PTSD these current 
concerns (or motivations) might relate to threat. 
A second study by McNally, Litz, Prassas, Shin, and Weathers, (1994) 
assessed autobiographical memory (our memory for events that relate to the 
self) in Vietnam veterans with PTSD, veterans with other mental disorders, 
and with well adjusted controls. The study found that PTSD patients retrieve 
the same amount of combat-related memories as well adjusted veterans, but 
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that they have a marked inability to retrieve other specific autobiographical 
memories of a non-traumatic nature, especially after being exposed to 
disorder specific information. These findings held even when the effects of 
depressive (but not anxiety) symptoms were controlled for. Overgenerality of 
autobiographical memories is assumed to be important in the maintenance of 
PTSD because emotional numbing, a feature of this disorder may be linked 
to a relative inability to retrieve specific memories (and associated emotions 
and coping strategies) of a positive nature (McNally et al, 1994). 
It is impossible in this study to determine whether overgenerality in PTSD 
occurs as an antecedent or consequence of the disorder. There are two 
possible explanations for the effects of overgenerality. On the one hand it 
may result from a persons limited cognitive capacity. Intrusive memories 
would consume cognitive capacity preventing the retrieval of other specific 
memories. On the other hand it may precede exposure to combat and thus 
result from some other factor. There is in fact some evidence that 
overgenerality develops as a result of childhood trauma (Williams, in press, 
cited in McNally et al 1994), and that it develops through childhood strategies 
(carried into adulthood) of blunting the emotional impact of trauma by 
retrieving only those memories which are overgeneral in nature. Other 
explanations for overgeneral memory include the hypothesis that when 
traumatic events occur in childhood preferential processing is given to 
positive and negative events because they are traumatic or because they 
represent the avoidance of traumatic experiences. This results in the 
schematization of positive and negative events and increases the likelihood 
that general rather than specific memories will be retrieved in later life 
(Williams, 1992). Both of these explanations suppose that early traumatic 




A third hypothesis suggests that it is problems in the functioning of short-
term (working) memory that results in overgeneral memory. This theory 
posits that strong avoidance responses to traumatic memories take up the 
capacity of working memory and this prevents the patients from 
understanding and being able to carry out any other cognitive tasks required 
of them. This hypothesis is supported by the finding that greater avoidance 
of traumatic memories results in longer latencies to retrieve specific 
memories to positive cues (Kuyken, & Brewin, 1995). Despite these findings 
current research does not allow one to determine whether overgeneral 
memory is a function of avoidance of reminders of the event or whether 
overgeneral memory is a function of differences in the way traumatic events 
are represented in long-term memory. However, because of the proposed 
link between overgeneral memory and emotional numbing it becomes 
important to determine what are the structures and processes involved in 
memory that allows such a phenomenon to occur. 
These studies indicate that there are memory factors involved in PTSD. 
However there has not been enough research conducted to elucidate the 
exact nature of these effects. What is known is that PTSD involves an 
attentional bias to threat-relevant information, possibly related to the current 
concerns of the patient (in the case of PTSD threat representations), which 
interferes with other cognitive tasks. As well as an attentional bias for threat-
relevant information PTSD is characterised by overgeneral memory for other 
non-traumatic information. Overgeneral memory may be partially 
responsible for the maintenance of the disorder. Both of these factors, 
attentional bias and overgeneral memory, are important indicators of 
cognitive processes which current theory needs to address. Clearly more 
research is required in this area. 
15 
Hyperarousal 
In the DSM, PTSD is classified as an anxiety disorder. This is because it 
involves a number of symptoms observed in anxiety disorders in general 
such as a persistent level of increased arousal. Increased arousal is 
indicated by sleep disturbances (nightmares and other disordered sleep 
patterns), anger and irritability, difficulty concentrating, hypervigilance and/or 
exaggerated startle responses. 
Duration of Response 
In order to be diagnosed with PTSD the DSM-111-R and the DSM-IV 
require that the above symptoms have been present for at least one month. 
Symptoms of PTSD can develop some time after the initial trauma occurred. 
Thus the classification of PTSD allows for a diagnosis of delayed onset if the 
symptoms first appeared at least six months after the traumatic event 
occurred. Likewise an acute diagnosis can be given for symptoms that last 
for less than three or more months. It is presumed that acute and chronic 
PTSD differ in some fundamental way and some theories of PTSD attempt to 
explain this difference. 
Related Issues 
As wel! as the defined diagnostic criteria there are a number of other 
clinical observations which are important in regard to why PTSD develops 
and how it is maintained. These include the importance of pre-trauma 
characteristics, the differential severity of PTSD symptoms, the buffering 
effects of social support, and the effects of predictability and controllability of 
a traumatic event. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
INFORMATION PROCESSING THEORIES OF 
PTSD 
Introduction 
Any current theory of PTSD needs to explain or account for the following; 
the symptoms of the disorder ( especially re-experiencing) and the differential 
severity of PTSD symptoms. It must also explain the absence of symptoms 
in people exposed to a similar traumatic event and the delayed onset of 
PTSD in some cases. 
As well as these factors it must be able to accommodate current 
research findings such as the buffering effects of social support, the 
importance of pre-trauma characteristics and experiences (in particular the 
role of perceived controllability and predictability of the traumatic event), and 
the findings in the area of trauma and memory. In particular it must be able 
to account for the effects (or interaction) of trauma and autobiographical 
memory (our memory for self-relevant events). PTSD is a disorder that 
involves the experience and the re-experiencing of traumatic events that are 
by their very nature highly personally significant. It seems obvious that any 
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account for or at the very least accommodate for the research on this facet of 
PTSD. 
Of all psychiatric disorders PTSD is the most likely to be explained by 
psychological constructs (as opposed to biological and genetic factors). 
Unlike other anxiety disorders PTSD involves the experience of a specific 
external event(s) and the re-experiencing symptoms of PTSD involves 
processing the information that this event(s) contained. As such the 
theories of PTSD which take into account cognitive (information processing) 
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factors are the ones most likely to prove fruitful in the future. It is proposed 
here that processing information from events involves the interaction of 
motivational, emotional and behavioural factors on encoding, storage and 
retrieval of "memories" of the event. 
In this chapter I will present the theories of PTSD that attempt to explain 
the processing of information in traumatic situations and evaluate them in 
terms of how they can accommodate or explain the findings and the 
questions raised from the memory research into PTSD. 
Horowitz (1976, 1986) 
Horowitz proposes that PTSD develops when an individual is unable to 
incorporate information about traumatic experiences into existing cognitive 
schemas. 
This models emphasis is on information processing and cognitive 
theories of emotion based on a psycho-analytic concept of trauma. An event 
"outside the range of normal human experience" is hypothesised to disrupt 
the psychological equilibrium of an individual. Resolution of this trauma 
involves the incorporation of traumatic information into pre-existing schemas 
or through the development of new schemas. 
Horowitz argues that a person "experiencing" extreme traumatization 
cannot ( or is unable) to process the massive amount of information 
contained in the trauma. So this information is pushed out of conscious 
awareness and remains in a raw, unprocessed, and active form in memory. 
When information is in this active state in memory it is out of consciousness 
but has an influence on ego functioning. Horowitz sees denial and 
emotional numbing as defence mechanisms that keep the memories of the 
trauma from overwhelming a person. These mechanisms keep the 
memories out of conscious awareness. However because of the "completion 
tendancy" 1 these memories of the trauma are called into consciousness 
1 Completion Tendency. A process whereby information taken from events is processed 
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briefly in the form of intrusive thoughts and images. Because these 
intrusions break into consciousness unexpectedly they are accompanied by 
intense emotions. 
This "information overload" once again evokes denial and avoidance 
reactions. In this way oscillation will occur between periods of intrusion and 
periods of withdrawal until the traumatic information is fully integrated. This 
oscillation between denial and intrusion is seen by Horowitz as a naturally 
occurring part of information processing. 
Intrusion can be viewed as adaptive in that its' aim is to facilitate 
information processing. Avoidance and emotional numbing are coping 
processes which control the rate at which information is processed. While 
excessive intrusion will overwhelm a person, excessive control of these 
processes (through avoidance and numbing) can prevent complete cognitive 
processing of the event. 
When it comes to therapy the focus of Horowitz's theory is on completing 
the process of information processing. This will occur when the traumatic 
information becomes part of "long term models and inner schemata". 
Critical Comments 
Horowitz's theory is one of the most comprehensive in this area. It 
accounts for the symptoms of PTSD and is able to explain the development1 
maintenance and delayed onset of the disorder. However it fails to explain 
why some people develop PTSD and others do not. 
Horowitz's model proposes that there is a mismatch of information 
between existing schemas and the information provoked by traumatic 
experiences. However as Foa and Riggs (1994) have pointed out, this 
theory is unable to explain the occurrence of PTSD in people with a previous 
history of trauma. These individuals should not develop PTSD according to 
until reality and cognitive models match. This involves either the termination of the situation 
or the alteration of the cognitive model to incorporate the new information. 
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Horowitz's theory because after processing of this information was complete, 
"traumatic experiences" should have been incorporated into their inner 
schemata. Thus being confronted with traumatic experiences in later life 
should not result in a mismatch of information. 
Horowitz refers to the memories of the trauma as being held in an active 
form in memory. Besides this reference he makes no other comment about 
how memory processes are involved in PTSD. However, his theory raises a 
number of questions about the nature of peoples' memories for traumatic 
experiences. He argues that when we experience a trauma we are unable to 
process all of the information contained in the experience. If this premise is 
true then what are the limitations on the processing of information from 
events, and what factors or processes determine the kind of information that 
will be encoded from events and when this information will be encoded? 
Horowitz also argues that traumatic information is pushed out of conscious 
awareness and into an active state in memory. How does information differ 
when it is active or inactive? According to Horowitz this information, once it 
is processed, becomes part of "long term models and inner schemata". This 
statement implies that information about traumatic events can only be held in 
long-term memory once it is accommodated into pre-existing models and 
schemata. If this is true then where is traumatic information held before it 
becomes part of long-term models and schemata? Is it held in short-term or 
working memory? If it is, how is it held in this system, and what are the 
effects of this on other processes governed by working memory? Lastly how 
can information that is not contained in long-term memory be accessed in the 
way the intrusive material is? Horowitz's theory does not consider any of 
these questions even though they have important consequences for why 
memories are re-experienced in PTSD. 
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Foa and Kozak (1986) 
Foa and Kozak developed a theory to account for fear and anxiety based 
on Lang's (1977, 1979) semantic memory network. It is from this theory that 
many current information processing theories of anxiety are based, therefore 
the main components of these theories will be considered. 
Lang proposed that people's experiences of the environment are 
organised into semantic memory networks that contain three kinds of 
information; (1) information about stimuli, (2) information about responses to 
stimuli, and (3) information about the meaning of stimuli and responses. 
Lang argues that the purpose of the memory system is to evoke 
behavioural responses. In memory people associate certain stimuli and 
behavioural responses with unwanted consequences (including emotions) 
and other stimuli and responses with desired consequences. Memory 
networks related to specific events and emotions form around these factors. 
In this way a memory network associated with fear can be thought of as a 
program for escape and avoidance behaviour. 
According to Lang information is encoded from events and stored in 
long-term memory as schematicized, abstracted and generalised 
propositional information. Therefore memories (and thus memory networks) 
are made up of semantic propositional constructs and not representations of 
objects stored in memory in an analogue form. These "memories" can be 
accessed using either verbal or perceptual cues, and are retrieved via 
constructive processes (Neisser, 1967) where information, which has been 
abstracted from events and stored in long-term memory, is acted upon by 
some (unspecified) process whose purpose is to generate the experience of 
an image (Kosslyn, 1975). 
Schematic memory networks, such as Lang's were first proposed by 
Quillian (1968). They were developed around the basic premise that 
knowledge in the brain is highly interconnected. A semantic network 
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consists of two main elements: nodes and links. Nodes refer to concepts or 
classes of 'things' (objects, events, actions) and links refer to the relations 
between different nodes. Associative knowledge (in the form of propositions) 
is contained in these networks at the links between nodes. Thus the 
information contained at a node is the association between different 
concepts or classes of entities. In this way semantic networks are said to 
represent people's beliefs and knowledge of the world, acquired primarily via 
verbal learning. 
According to network theory, when a person remembers or engages in 
any mental process, the associative network is activated, and a spread of 
activation occurs along the links and nodes of the network. This process is 
assumed to occur relatively automatically and is referred to as "automatic 
information processing". Thus when a person is presented with a cue, the 
memory network is accessed. Associative spread in the memory network 
results in recall of associated concepts (memories). A fear memory will be 
accessed when a critical number of informational units from the environment 
is matched to units contained in one's memory structure. These 'cues' will be 
about either the feared stimuli, about a persons responses to these stimuli, 
or about the meaning attached to these stimuli and/or responses (Lang, 
1979). 
To Lang it is the processing of stimulus, response and meaning 
elements in these structures that distinguishes emotional from non-emotional 
cognitive processing. In fact he sees the aim of therapy as the 
reorganisation of the response elements in the emotional image unit in a way 
that breaks down the meanings associated with these stimuli and responses. 
Thus an emotional image is considered by Lang as a network of (semantic) 
propositional units containing stimulus, response and meaning elements. 
The propositional constructs in a memory network will be added or 
subtracted at each successive reconstruction of the memory. Thus what is 
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remembered about events will change over time as people form different 
associations between stimulus, response, and meaning elements in their 
memory networks. 
Foa and Kozak contend that if a fear structure is a program to escape 
danger (as Lang posits) then it must contain information that stimuli and/or 
responses are dangerous, and thus to be avoided. Therefore for Foa and 
Kozak the distinguishing feature of a pathological fear structure is the 
information it contains about threat. What distinguishes anxious from non-
anxious populations is that the fear structures of clinically anxious people 
contain excessive or strong response elements relating to threat (such as 
avoidance responses and physiological activity), and a resistance to 
modification. So for example, a rape victim's fear in a social situation is 
evoked by the meaning (a perception of threat) that is attached to the stimuli 
and responses involved in interacting in that situation, and from the 
associations (memories and meanings) that this activates in her/his semantic 
memoty network. 
Foa and Kozak believe that the persistence of fears in such memory 
structures results from (1) the marked structural coherence of the fear 
structure, and (2) from "impairments in mechanisms for the processing of 
fear-relevant information" (Foa and Kozak, 1985; my italics). According to 
this theory clinically anxious patients fear structures will be easier to activate 
than non-anxious individuals because in a fearful situation the associations 
they have between the stimuli, responses and the meaning elements of this 
situation are more coherent and strong, and thus more easily activated from 
memory. 
Therapy in this case involves breaking down or weakening the links 
between stimuli, responses, and meaning in the memory networks via 
exposure-based therapy. This means that when the memory network is 
activated, by being presented with a internal or external cue, the former 
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associations (between the links in the network) cannot be activated and the 
fear associated with these relations will not be evoked. 
Foa, Steketee, & Rothbaum (1989) 
Foa, Steketee, & Rothbaum (1989) applied Foa and Kozak1s (1986) 
model of fear memory networks to PTSD in order to explain the development 
and maintenance of the disorder. 
They propose that traumatic events produce large and complex fear 
networks. These networks are readily activated because, through 
conditioning and generalisation, a large number of fear producing 
associations are formed. These associations which were once considered 
neutral and safe have now become linked with fear. This generalisation of 
fear leads to a feeling of unpredictability and uncontrollability in situations. 
Foa et al contend that these processes are important in the development of 
PTSD. 
Foa et al reiterate that a fear structure is distinguished from other 
memory structures by the information that it contains about the meaning of 
events - danger. They suggest that traumatic events are represented as a 
structure in memory. When this structure acquires a meaning about the 
presence of danger (threat) then it will develop into a fear structure. Foa et 
al contend that the processing of information during a trauma is deficient 
because of the threat and danger present. This skews the information 
network towards threat and the information encoded into the network from 
events will be confused and disorganised. 
PTSD differs from other anxiety disorders because the traumatic event is 
extremely personally significant and because it violates beliefs about safety 
(Foa et al, 1989). This means that stimuli and responses that previously 
signalled safety have come to be associated with the perception of threat (via 
classical and instrumental conditioning). 
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An important contention of Foa et al 1s theory is the importance of 
predictability and controllability of traumatic events. A number of studies 
have shown the importance of predictability and controllability in stressful 
situations when the consequences of failure are aversive (Masserman, 1971; 
Mineka & Kihlstrom, 1978; Staub, Tursky, & Schwartz, 1971; Geer & Maisel, 
1972; Roth & Kubal, 1975). In particular an unpredictable trauma and a 
failure to exercise perceived control in a situation may strengthen the effects 
of post-traumatic stress reactions (Foa et al, 1989). When there is a loss of 
predictability and controllability and in the absence of safety signals a person 
lives in a state of chronic fear. This feeling of loss of control would make it 
hard for a trauma survivor to trust their reactions in situations because they 
no longer have safety signals to judge these situations with, and this could 
lead to withdrawal from activities and situations that were previously 
considered enjoyable. 
Foe et al predict that a person is more likely to develop PTSD if a trauma 
occurs in what was a previously safe environment because it is more likely to 
violate beliefs about safety. PTSD is also more likely to develop if the line 
between safety and danger becomes blurred, because as research has 
shown, when a person is anxious they are more likely to interpret ambiguous 
situations as threatening (Butler & Mathews, 1983). In such cases 
individuals will develop exaggerated beliefs in the probability of harm (feared 
consequences) occurring. People who are anxious exaggerate the 
probability of harm occurring because they no longer have safety signals with 
which to interpret social situations. This results in a constant search of the 
environment for threats. The perception of threat in ambiguous situations is 
presumed to prime memory networks for activation. This implies that 
memories of traumatic events act to prepare an organism for escape or 
avoidance behaviour. 
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The fear structure in PTSD differs from that of other anxiety disorders in 
three ways: the intensity of the responses, the size of the structure, and the 
accessibility of the structure. The violation of safety assumptions results in 
large stimulus generalisation and higher order conditioning of erroneous 
stimuli and responses. Thus a great number of stimuli will activate the 
structure. This results in a low threshold for activation of the structure. It will 
also result in frequent bursts of arousal and re-experiencing alternating with 
attempts to avoid and escape such fear provoking situations. 
Foa and Kozak (1986) propose that two conditions are necessary for the 
reduction of fear in memory networks. First all elements of the fear structure 
must be accessed to consciousness, (if they are not in consciousness they 
cannot be altered); and secondly, information incompatible with the fear 
structure must be presented. If one is presented with information that 
confirms that contained in a memory network, then fear to that object or 
situation will be strengthened. Likewise information that does not confirm 
that contained in the memory will weaken that fear structure. This occurs 
because disconfirming information weakens the associations between 
stimuli, responses, and attached meaning. Repeated traumatization will 
result in more or stronger associations in the memory network because each 
successive traumatization strengthens the associations between links in the 
network. This will make the development of PTSD more likely. 
Because traumatic fear structures contain a large number of elements in 
their structures they are easily matched by cues from the environment, and 
thus easily activated. Foa et al argue that although the fear structures in 
PTSD sufferers will be easily activated they will be less likely to be activated 
in entirety. This occurs for two reasons; (1) more elements in the structure 
means that it will be harder to match all of them, and this makes it harder to 
extinguish fear to all the elements, and (2) large fear structures like those 
seen in PTSD are likely to be less cohesive (i.e. the stimulus-response-
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meaning associations will be more intricate). Only those parts of the fear 
structure that are accessed can be altered. 
Strong response elements (emotions and physiological arousal) in the 
memory network foster avoidance which results in brief activation of the fear 
structure and an absence of habituation to fear, and exposure to corrective 
information. Despite these factors Foa et al contend that people activate 
their fear structures during day to day existence. Consequently it is only the 
11super-avoiders 11 who will be able to completely prevent accommodation of 
some corrective information. Habituation of fear effects the meaning 
associated with the traumatic event and the arousal associated with 
response elements in the network. Short-term (within-session) habituation of 
fear constitutes information to a persons memory network that acts to alter 
the fear structure. Information about lowered arousal during re-experiencing 
episodes is inconsistent with response information contained in the structure 
(i.e. that escape and avoidance of the feared stimulus are the only ways in 
which to terminate anxiety). This new information about arousal weakens 
the links between the stimulus and response elements. The 11 new memory 11 
will be less readily activated because incoming information will only be able 
to match the stimulus elements in the structure. Foa and Kozak (1986) 
postulated that within-session and long term habituation of fear are two 
separate processes. Only long-term habituation represents a change in a 
persons representation of threat. Long-term habituation of fear will occur 
when the meaning associated with the trauma changes. 
Foa et al (1989) contend that the fear structures of acute and chronic 
PTSD sufferers may differ. Chronic sufferers memory structures may 
contain more stimuli elements and more intense response elements. Larger 
more intense memory structures would require more exposure to break down 
the associations. Thus those people with strong, large fear memory 
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structures are more likely to develop chronic PTSD because it would take 
longer, and it will be harder, to break these structures down. 
A number of factors will interfere with the ability to process corrective 
information. If the disparity between the fear memory structure and the 
presented information is too great to activate the memory structure; because 
of a failure to encode new information due to avoidance behaviours or 
inattention; because the information contained in the exposure situation 
(about potential harm) does not contradict that contained in the fear memory; 
or because the information presented in the exposure situation is 
misinterpreted (cognitively biased processing of information along lines that 
confirm the fear memory, or, expectancy-consistent information processing). 
Foa et al see social support as enhancing recovery from a trauma by 
encouraging the person to discuss the event. By discussing the event it will 
be called into consciousness and alternate beliefs and coping strategies to 
those originally concluded by the person can be considered. 
Foa et al (1989) consider emotional numbing, distractibility, and memory 
loss as cognitive avoidance strategies. Avoidance will produce re-
experiencing symptoms because emotional processing is prevented from 
occurring. Foa et al do not specify how these variables act to produce PTSD 
nor do they describe the processes which produce them. 
They propose that the trauma needs to be highly emotionally intensive 
for PTSD to develop and that only intense, unpredictable, uncontrollable 
traumas will result in PTSD. Finally, they propose that the essential nature of 
PTSD is that the "meaning" (threat) associated with stimuli and responses 
predicts post-traumatic stress reactions. This is evidenced by the finding that 
perceived threat is a better predictor of PTSD than actual threat (Sales, 




While Foa et al incorporate the variables of predictability and 
controllability of traumatic experiences (in fact these are central components 
in their theory) they do not elaborate on the mechanism through which these 
variables help to activate the fear network, or how this may help distinguish 
PTSD from other anxiety disorders. The model is limited because Foa et al 
do not discuss in detail several important variables (i.e. the role of social 
support, how emotional numbing and delayed reactions arise). Likewise they 
do not explain why people who have experienced a similar trauma do not all 
develop PTSD. They suggests that perceived threat and previous 
experience are important in this area but they do not discuss the precise role 
of these variables. 
Because emotional reactions to stress play an important part in Foa et 
al's theory the question is raised, what is the role and function of emotion in 
memory network formation, and in traumatic experiences in particular? 
Semantic memory networks such as Lang's (1977, 1979), and thus Foa et 
al's (1989), contend that emotions are represented by nodes in the memory 
network. Activating the node also activates the corresponding ( or 
associated) emotion (Bower, 1981). For example when a traumatic event 
occurs links form between stimuli, responses, and attributed meanings. Fear 
reactions to traumatic material will occur when fear becomes associated to 
stimuli, responses and meanings at the nodes in the memory network. Thus 
accessing traumatic memories accesses the associated fear (and visa 
versa). However network theories such as those proposed to be involved in 
PTSD have problems explaining how an emotion in a memory network can 
be differentially activated. Semantic memory networks by themselves 
cannot account for how an emotional concept (such as fear) and an emotion 
(feeling afraid) are differentially activated from the same node in the memory 
network. Thus how can Foa et al's theory account for the fact that PTSD 
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involves perceiving a situation as threatening and feeling fear at the 
reminders of this event. 
If emotion is involved in PTSD, as it most assuredly is, then how exactly 
is it involved? If an emotion is tagged to a memory (as semantic networks 
suppose) via associations at a node then blocking out the emotional 
experience of a trauma should also block out the memory of that trauma. 
This is not what occurs. PTSD patients can recall the details of the traumatic 
event but this often occurs with no accompanying emotion. In other words 
people can intellectualise their emotional experiences without re-
experiencing them. Thus it would seem that emotion is related to the 
experience of the event but not in the way proposed by semantic memory 
networks. 
Teasdale (1993) argues for two levels of meaning in cognitive structures: 
a propositional (explicit) and an implicational (implicit) meaning. Teasdale 
proposes that only the activation of a implicational subsystem will result in 
the experience of an emotion. Activation of the propositional subsystem by 
itself will result in memories without emotion, "cold" intellectualisation of 
emotional experiences. Because meaning can be applied to memories at 
two different levels, "propositional" semantic memory networks (like those 
proposed to be involved in the information processing of traumatic 
experiences) should not result in the experience of an emotion. 
According to Teasdale's theory, mood-dependant recall (Bower, 1981) 
of traumatic material results from the activation of implicational codes of 
meaning. Thus an anxious or fearful mood will activate higher levels of 
meaning (implicational meaning) which accesses and primes traumatic 
memories for recall. Teasdale proposes that affect-related biases in 
information processing (like those observed in the memory research with 
PTSD) are better seen as the effects of generating schematic levels of 
information (i.e. accessing abstract information from meaning structures), 
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rather than generating information at the level of activation of specific 
constructs (memory networks). Automatic thoughts accessed from these 
schematic implicational levels of meaning will then mediate emotional 
responses. 
It follows from this that therapy for PTSD needs to reflect that emotional 
disorders are the result of more than the explicit relations held in memory 
networks. Not only should the propositional aspects of the memory structure 
be considered in therapy, but also the implicational meanings accessed from 
more abstract cognitive-evaluational structures that form the basis of and 
determine explicit information processing. 
Teasdale (1993) points out that information processing theorists tend to 
overlook that there are two kinds of information processing; an automatic 
11 unconscious 11 and a controlled 11 conscious 11 information processing. 
Automatic information processing can be thought of as pre-attentive, non-
conscious, rapid and effortless, subject to few capacity limitations, and it may 
occur in parallel, but it is also inflexible and is unable to help with the 
adaptation of new or unfamiliar experiences which cannot be assimilated 
into existing meaning structures. Processes which can be considered 
automatic are priming, recognition, associative spread, and emotional 
responses. Controlled information processing is considered consciously 
monitored or controlled, effortful, very flexible, and is used for the adaptation 
of new or unfamiliar information. It is also strongly capacity-limited, relatively 
slow and usually serial in nature. Controlled processes include selective 
attention, recall, rehearsal, and elaboration (Lundh, 1995). These different 
forms of information processing have already been implicated in the research 
on memory and trauma (see Chapter One). Automatic processing of 
information may result in the attentional biases to threat-relevant information 
observed in PTSD patients (Zeitlan & McNally, 1991; Foa et al, 1991; 
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Cassiday et al, 1992). Such biases are assumed to result in the chronic 
activation of intrusive material experienced by trauma survivors. 
Thus, not only are there two levels at which meaning is attached to 
events, but there is also two ways in which information from events is used in 
cognitive processing. Despite the importance of these factors for information 
processing Foa et al make little attempt to account for them in PTSD. 
Foa and Riggs (1993) 
It has already been noted that Horowitz's information mismatch theory 
has problems accounting for the occurrence of PTSD in people with a past 
experience of trauma. Foa and Riggs propose a curvilinear relationship 
between existing schemata and the development of PTSD. 
People who have experienced trauma in the past are more likely to 
develop PTSD after a subsequent trauma if they made negative assumptions 
about the world and their self-competence after the initial trauma. If a 
subsequent trauma contains information that confirms their negative views 
this will serve to strengthen their negative memory network. 
Individuals will also be more susceptible to PTSD if they have never 
experienced trauma before. If someone views the world as safe when a 
traumatic event occurs they will find these views violated. Only in this 
situation will they suffer from the "mismatch" theory proposed by Horowitz 
whereby the information contained in the trauma is incompatible with their 
cognitive schemata of the world and their self. 
People who fall somewhere in between these extremes will be less likely 
to develop PTSD because they can more easily accommodate the trauma 
and its consequences (Foa and Riggs, 1993). They hold views of the world 
as sometimes safe and sometimes unsafe and of their selves as sometimes 
competent and sometimes incompetent. Thus when a major trauma occurs 
they have a number of coping strategies gleamed from past experiences 
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along with a sense of their ability to cope with such events. It is proposed by 
Foa and Riggs that these factors are vulnerabilities that act to increase or 
decrease the likelihood of developing PTSD after a traumatic experience. 
Creamer. Burgess. & Pattison. (1992) 
Creamer et al proposed a model which is a synthesis and reevaluation of 
previous information processing models. The aim of the model was to 
experimentally evaluate the cognitive information-processing mechanisms of 
recovery. Like other information-processing theories Creamer et al believe 
that recovery from PTSD involves the integration of the trauma. They 
propose that this occurs in five stages, and that the process of recovery 
includes a feedback loop between intrusions, avoidance and symptom levels. 
Stage One: Objective Exposure 
This stage is determined by the severity of the traumatic stressor. It will 
be mediated by various processing variables, and is responsible for whether 
a person will develop PTSD or not. 
Stage Two: Network Formation 
Acute and long-term reactions to trauma are mediated by the meanings 
that people give to events. How one appraises the traumatic event will 
determine whether PTSD develops. Without a perception of threat the 
situation will not result in PTSD. 
The form of the traumatic memory network will be determined by the 
nature of the trauma. It will include stimulus, response, and meaning 
propositions. The strength of the network will depend on other pre-trauma 
and predisposing factors (not specified). This stage is termed network 
formation. The network is formed through the processing of the stimuli 
present at the time of the trauma and by attaching a meaning or 
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interpretation to the event. Network formation will be mediated by the 
severity of the stressor and will determine the level of intrusions. 
Stage Three: Intrusions 
In this stage the memory network is activated by the presentation of 
information that matches in some way that contained in the memory network. 
Activation of this network will also activate the stimulus and response 
elements of the network. This will produce intrusions and the accompanying 
aversive response elements (avoidance, hyper-arousal). 
Intrusive memories can be either adaptive (in that they promote 
information processing) or maladaptive (in that they produce psychological 
distress). Activating traumatic memories allows the stimulus-response 
associations to weaken and this alters the meaning attached to the event. 
(According to Teasdale the extinction of such propositional meanings is not 
enough to prevent the reoccurrence of symptoms. lmplicational meanings 
which filter and bias information processing would also need to be 
addressed). 
Intrusions will be adaptive if they allow the process of modification of 
meaning to occur, or maladaptive if they produce high arousal which 
prevents this process from occurring. Network resolution processing is 
assumed to be a function of the duration of exposure to the traumatic event 
(Foa et al, 1989). With longer exposure to memories promoting greater 
habituation to fear. 
Unlike Horowitz (1986), Creamer et al believe that the intrusions occur 
prior to escape and avoidance (which they consider coping strategies), 
because they occur as a response to the large number of stimuli that evoke 
intrusions. Thus they propose that a high level of intrusion is likely to be 
associated with high symptom levels in the future. 
Creamer et al argue that intrusions are a less adaptive way of producing 
recovery from trauma than being exposed to the memories via talking about 
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the trauma with friends and family, through therapeutic exposure, and/or by 
deliberately seeking out new information related to the experience. In such 
cases the trauma survivor is assumed to be making a conscious effort to 
recall the trauma. Conscious recall of memories constitutes a more 
controlled access to the memory network, presumably longer in duration and 
is thus less likely to produce avoidance reactions (Creamer et al, 1992). 
Stage Four: Avoidance 
Avoidance occurs in response to, and as a coping strategy, to intrusions. 
When high levels of escape and avoidance are occurring Creamer et al 
(1992) predict there will also be a persistence in psychological symptoms 
and that avoidance at later stages will reflect earlier levels of avoidance. 
Avoidance will be influenced by levels of intrusion and individual coping 
strategies. If someone has traditionally used escape and avoidance they will 
continue to do so after a traumatic event. 
Outcome 
Recovery occurs through network resolution processing; which continues 
until there is an active modification of the memory network. 
Critical Comments 
While Creamer et al's model a!!ows for the experimental evaluation of 
information processing theories in PTSD, it fails to account for and/or 
overlooks a number of factors including how and why intrusive episodes 
increase or decrease during the disorder and through the process of 
recovery. 
Creamer et al note that consciously seeking out information and 
consciously recalling memories of the trauma is a better way of accessing 
the memory network than re-experiencing. The importance of this statement 
lies in Creamer et al's acknowledgement of different kinds of information 
processing. Intrusions are supposed to represent a form of automatic 
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information processing (Zeitlan & McNally, 1991). Such automatic 
processing is assumed to be responsible for priming intrusive material and 
for making it chronically accessible (Zeitlan & McNally, 1991; Foa et al, 
1991 ). Presumably, this form of processing will access information 
contained in memory structures in a different manner to controlled 
information processing. Unfortunately Creamer et al do not describe how 
these processes act to increase intrusive thoughts and memories except for 
stating that controlled information processing will access the memory 
network for a longer duration than automatic information processing. As the 
research into autobiographical memory shows it may be the cue used to 
access memory structures, and whether the access is voluntary (controlled) 
or involuntary (automatic), that determines the form and the content of the 
memory. Both automatic and controlled information processing are 
determined by the nature of people's memory structures and these factors 
will be considered in the next chapter. 
Creamer (1993) 
Creamer argues that stressful life events prior to the trauma will help 
produce PTSD because they increase vulnerability, while low stress before a 
trauma will also produce PTSD because it gives a false sense of 
invulnerability (Ruch, Chandler, &. Harter, 1980; Ruch &. Leon, 1983). The 
research on this area is mixed. While some studies suggest that prior 
experience of trauma will increase vulnerability (Burgess & Holstrom, 1979), 
others suggest that prior experience prevents PTSD by lowering vulnerability 
(see review by Raphael, 1986). Possibly the important factor in whether 
previous experience of trauma increases or decreases vulnerability to PTSD 
is whether the trauma was resolved or not. If one recovers well from an 
initial trauma this will help prevent PTSD by facilitating coping strategies and 
the belief in ones competence. If a person does not recover well from a 
previous experience then a negative schemata will be formed or 
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strengthened and this will prime the memory structure for access during 
future traumas (Creamer, 1993). 
Creamer (1993) reports that a consistent finding in the trauma research 
is that of previous psychiatric comorbidity (Burgess & Holstrom, 1979; 
Creamer et al, 1993; McFarlane, 1988). Creamer argues that previous 
psychiatric illness constitutes a vulnerability to PTSD which manifests in poor 
post traumatic adjustment. This finding is contrary to Horowitz's mismatch 
theory, but supports that of Foa and Riggs (1993), that previous trauma will 
strengthen existing negative schemata. 
Processing of traumatic information (network information processing) will 
be influenced by peoples' past experiences and therefore by their pre-
existing schemata. Creamer et al (1993) argue that people with a strong 
danger schemata will tend to process cues (information) from an episode 
which contain threat to the detriment of other stimuli. This results in a biased 
record of the event. If someone has a negative self-schemata then they will 
process information from the trauma along this bias. This will result in 
negative feelings related to the self such as guilt and self-blame. 
People with strong "invulnerability" schemata will be bewildered by the 
occurrence of a traumatic event and will be unable to process it effectively. 
This results in a fragmented memory record. If the trauma confirms ones 
beliefs that 'bad' things happen but it is not my fault (flexible schemata) then 
this should result in a less emotionally charged memory. 
Critical Comments 
Creamers contention on the importance of pre-existing schemata in the 
development of PTSD is similar to the proposed importance of "mental 
contamination" in cognitive processing (Wilson & Brekke, 1994). Research 
by Wilson and Brekke has shown that peoples' judgements and evaluations 
of situations can be adversely influenced by unconscious and uncontrollable 
information processing and that this results in unwanted emotions, 
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evaluations, and behaviours. This is a form of automatic processing where 
individuals make use of pre-existing beliefs and expectancies to categorise 
incoming information. This results in three forms of selective information 
processing; selective exposure to situations, selective attention to facets of 
situations and selective interpretation of situations and behaviour. Pre-
existing beliefs are used as cognitive shortcuts to filter experiences of the 
environment. In times of high stress or high cognitive load the information in 
an event that confirms what one expects will receive more attention and 
more processing resources than expectancy-inconsistent information. This 
produces judgements about situations and self-performance that are biased 
in an expectancy-consistent manner. This process perpetuates the pre-
existing beliefs and skews the resulting memory network in an expectancy-
consistent manner. The contamination of information processing of 
traumatic events can be primed by the presentation of stimuli (moods, prior 
exposure to similar cues) that form part of ones' unconscious cognitive-
evaluative structures (implicational meaning structures). Because these 
structures are unconscious people will be unaware of and largely unable to 
alter how information in that situation is processed. 
Jones & Barlow (1990) 
By comparing PTSD with other anxiety disorders Jones and Bariow have 
developed a theory to account for the development of PTSD. Their model 
takes into account the role of biological and psychological vulnerabilities and 
proposes that the development of anxious apprehension underlies chronic 
PTSD. 
Jones and Barlow propose that PTSD patients have a biological 
vulnerability to stress, which is (probably) genetically transmitted. They cite 
twin and family studies to support their contention. They postulate that these 
people inherit a predisposition to respond to stress with chronic autonomic 
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overarousal. They support this with research from Vietnam veterans with 
PTSD who exhibit a higher resting rate than controls (Blanchard, Kolb, 
Pallmeyer, & Gerardi, 1982; Blanchard, Kolb, Gerardi, Ryan, & Pallmeyer, 
1986). If these people experience negative life events then the 
predisposition to respond with autonomic overarousal will be activated. 
Barlow (1988) distinguishes between true, false, and learned alarms. 
True alarms occur when one has a fear response when faced with a life-
threatening event. False alarms occur when fear is felt in a situation that is 
not life-threatening, and a learned alarm is a conditioned response that 
develops to internal and external cues. In PTSD learned alarms develop to 
internal and external cues present at the time of the trauma (a true alarm). 
Alarms true, false, and conditioned produce anxiety reactions. Barlow 
(1988) conceptualises anxiety as a loose cognitive-affective structure. 
Certain variables (strong negative affect, and a set of preparatory behaviours 
for coping with situations that contain potential threat or harm) which are 
contained within a feedback loop, combine to produce chronic overarousal. 
In the course of PTSD the individual perceives the traumatic event and the 
instances of re-experiencing as unpredictable and uncontrollable and reacts 
with chronic overarousal. Chronic overarousal is accompanied by a biased 
processing of information. This processing is characterised by hyper-
vigilance and attentional narrowing towards sources of potential threat in a 
situation. 
Foa et al (1989) see the experience of a perceived threat and 
generalisation of the fear response as essential for the development of 
PTSD. Jones and Barlow believe that the learning of alarms is not sufficient 
to explain the occurrence of PTSD. They believe anxious apprehension 
needs to develop to alarms before the individual will show the symptoms 
characteristic of PTSD. Anxious apprehension is a future-oriented state of 
arousal which acts to prepare an organism for an action. In PTSD anxious 
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apprehension develops to external and internal stimuli related to the 
traumatic event. When anxious apprehension is occurring it interferes with 
the individuals ability to concentrate and perform other cognitive tasks 
(presumably because it takes up cognitive capacity). 
This process sets up a feedback loop where hyperarousal, 
hypervigilance and narrowing of attentional focus increases intrusive 
thoughts and re-experiencing by promoting avoidance to affect-related 
stimuli. 
Finally Jones and Barlow propose that the effects of these processes will 
be mediated by variables such as coping skills and social support. Although 
the precise means by which these variables act is unspecified, they suggest 
that problem-focused coping skills act by promoting a sense of control in the 
individual, and social support acts to buffer the effects of trauma. 
Critical Comments 
Jones and Barlow refer to attentional narrowing, hyperarousal, and 
hypervigilance as being responsible for increasing intrusive thoughts and 
memories but the question remains how do these variables act to increase 
intrusions. 
Problems with suppressing unwanted thoughts have been 
conceptuaiised by Wegner (1994). He proposes that suppression of 
unwanted thoughts (mental control) is possible, and that it results from a two 
step process. First, a monitoring process is activated that searches for 
unwanted thoughts that are inconsistent with a desired mental state (goal). 
When an unwanted thought is found or identified an operating process 
comes into use. This process substitutes unwanted thoughts with more 
appropriate (goal-consistent) thoughts. However, suppression of thoughts is 
resource demanding, if sufficient cognitive resources are not available then 
suppression fails and unwanted thoughts may actually be primed, become 
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more accessible and thus more easily activated. This priming of unwanted 
thoughts will occur when demand on cognitive resources is high such as in 
times of high arousal or stress. When a memory cue is given to recall a 
thought or an image via monitoring processes, the thought is accessed in the 
memory network, if there is low cognitive resources the operating process 
which seeks to suppress these thoughts by substituting them with alternative 
thoughts fails and these primed (unwanted) thoughts are likely to be 
activated. 
This highlights the importance of motivational factors (goals or current 
concerns for an individual) in producing or maintaining intrusions in PTSD. 
Another factor that may be important in increasing levels of intrusion will be 
an inability to recall specific memories of a non-traumatic nature -
overgeneral memory (McNally et al, 1994). If these more appropriate 
memories cannot be accessed then they cannot be used as substitutes for 
the intrusive thoughts. This would be especially important when these 
memories and thoughts relate to behavioural actions and coping strategies. 
Wegner's ( 1994) model of mental control and the memory research into 
PTSD indicate that memory, emotions and motivational factors may interact 
to produce chronic activation of intrusive material. Klinger (1975) proposed 
that attentional biases in information processing may be related to current 
concerns (or goals) for the individual, and a recent study by Riemann and 
McNally (1995) has demonstrated that current concerns act to inhibit 
cognitive processing in anxious and non-anxious subjects. Despite this, the 
role of motivations in theories of PTSD has received little attention in the 
PTSD research. 
As Jones and Barlow have noted, it is the cues associated with the 
trauma that will produce re-experiencing symptoms (presumably because 
they activate traumatic memory structures and access this information to 
consciousness), this promotes anxious apprehension and avoidance 
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reactions. If avoidance or suppression of intrusive thoughts and memories is 
interrupted, then these intrusive thoughts will be primed for recall, increasing 
the overall level of intrusive material. 
Comments on Information Processing Theories 
All of the theories presented here posit that information from a trauma 
and more specifically the way in which a person processes this information is 
responsible for the symptoms observed in PTSD; re-experiencing, avoidance 
of reminders of the traumatic event, and emotional numbing. 
A theory based on the processing of information needs to explain the 
underlying nature of encoding, storage, and retrieval of this information and 
how this information is structured in memory because presumably these are 
the factors that combine to produce the symptoms observed when 
processing fails or when processing acts in a manner maladaptive to 
psychological functioning (as in cases of mental contamination and mental 
control). 
Information processing theories posit that the information contained in a 
traumatic memory includes attributions about a persons beliefs of the world 
and self. As Lundh (1995) has noted beliefs are inseparable from 
motivations and emotions. Traumatic events by their very nature effect and 
are effected by a persons view of the world and of the self. This is evidenced 
by the fact that the level of perceived threat in a traumatic event is a better 
predictor of PTSD than actual threat. This concept of the self and the world 
depends on a persons experiences of the world and what they expect from 
the world and themselves. As has already been noted such expectations act 
to motivate an individual and to focus the processing of information. Thus 
the processing of information to and from events involves the interaction of 
motivational and emotional as well as cognitive factors. While the emotional 
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component of information processing is considered by PTSD theorists (Lang, 
1979), the role of motivations is often overlooked. Whether or not one 
develops PTSD after a traumatic event may be linked to that persons current 
life-goals at the time of the trauma, and how these motivations effect the 
processing of information from traumatic events. 
The processing of information from traumatic events necessitates the 
access of memories from long-term memory stores. Information processing 
theorists propose that exposure to traumatic information is necessary for the 
symptoms of PTSD to dissipate. However, a person cannot be exposed to 
this information without first calling it into mind or "working memory". Only 
when it is in this structure can it be manipulated in ways that allow one to 
alter its meaning (in fact this is what exposure therapy attempts to do). 
Images or mental representations of a traumatic event (intrusive 
episodes) can be either verbal (a thought) or perceptual (an image). Mental 
representations of events that relate to the self are autobiographical 
memories (Conway, 1990). Although autobiographical memories (and other 
autobiographical knowledge) are primary components of intrusive memories 
and thoughts, no theorist has attempted to delineate the processes involved 
in autobiographical memory and traumatic events even though research into 
autobiographical memory and PTSD has already begun (see research on 
memory and PTSD in Chapter One). 
While many of the information processing theories of PTSD presented 
here implicitly rely on concepts related to autobiographical memory they do 
not explicitly attempt to account for the processes and structures that are 
responsible for the encoding, storage, and retrieval of traumatic memories 
except in the most vague sense. For example Horowitz (1976) talks of 
traumatic material being held in an "active state in memory". He does not 
explain this statement or the process(es) that determine how information is 
encoded, stored and retrieved from this structure. Foa et al (1989) and 
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Creamer et al (1992) utilise semantic memory networks to explain the 
encoding, storage and retrieval of traumatic material, however as Teasdale 
(1993) has pointed out "propositional" semantic memory networks have 
problems explaining the experience of emotion in an individual. Teasdale 
argues that the activation of an implicational level of meaning is responsible 
for affect-related biases in information processing observed in PTSD. In the 
case of PTSD this means that in therapy not only must the specific 
information conveyed by the traumatic event be altered (i.e. the stimulus-
response meanings) but also the meanings involved in constructing that 
memory or thought (implicational meanings). Jones and Barlow (1990) take 
a different but related view of PTSD. They argue that ruminating about the 
potential threat in situations (anxious apprehension and attentional 
narrowing) is a necessary condition for the development of PTSD. The work 
by Wegner (1994) gives us a way to perceive how cognitive processing 
factors are involved in increasing intrusive episodes in PTSD. If intrusions 
are perceived as 'wrong' or inconsistent with the goals of the individual, then 
an attempt to avoid or suppress intrusions could lead to an increase in the 
overall level of intrusions. 
By looking at the processes of encoding, retrieval and storage of 
autobiographical memories, by considering the structures and systems that 
allows knowledge to interact with 'the self' to produce motivations and 
behavioural intentions, by describing how beliefs and goals interact with 
knowledge of events to produce "memories", then we may be able to better 
understand the processes involved in post-traumatic stress reactions. All of 
the components of information processing: cognitive capacity, attention, 
automatic and controlled information processing, and information 
assimilation are dependant on, and are part of, autobiographical memory 
processes. 




AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL KNOWLEDGE, AND 
THE PROCESSING OF TRAUMA 
Introduction 
A major contention of this work is that the processes and structures 
involved in encoding, storing, and retrieving information from traumatic 
events is at least partially responsible for the development and maintenance 
of PTSD. As already argued this necessitates a closer look at 
autobiographical memory. In order to place memory for traumatic 
experiences within a more general framework, it is necessary to first consider 
how memories for events differ from other forms of knowledge. 
Autobiographical memories can be conceived as a form of knowledge that 
shares some characteristics with other forms of knowledge but that it is the 
pattern of these characteristics and not any single defining characteristic 
that makes up what we call autobiographical memory (Conway, 1990). It is 
proposed here that motivations, emotions, and self-concepts are used to 
encode, store and retrieve information from events and are central to the 
processing of self-relevant events such as traumatic experiences. This 
chapter considers the findings of research and theory into the structure and 
organisation of autobiographical memory and begins to investigate how 
these factors are represented in PTSD. 
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Distinguishing Autobiographical Memory From Other Forms of 
Knowledge 
There a number of different kinds of knowledge that we use in day to day 
existence, and which we would be unable to function without, namely: 
procedural, semantic and episodic memory. 
Procedural memories are thought to represent information that is used in 
fairly automatic behaviours. They are not normally available to 
consciousness, although they must have been at some time in order for skills 
to have been learned. Once learnt they are hard to forget or modify. 
Procedural memories include skills such as whistling and riding a bike. 
Semantic memories on the other hand, are concerned with knowledge 
about states of the world which appear in the form of declarations (Tulving, 
1983, 1985). Semantic memories are represented as propositions such as 
"canaries have wings", and they give us information about the relationships 
between objects. Unlike procedural memories they are available to 
consciousness and are thus easily modified. However, neither semantic nor 
procedural knowledge has to be 'consciously remembered' in order for us to 
use it. 
The "experience of remembering" appears to be limited to the recall of 
events and episodes, what Tulving (1972) termed episodic memory. These 
are situations in which one remembers an experienced event which contains 
spatio-temporal information (details of time and space) (Conway, 1990). Like 
semantic memory, episodic memory contains information about (past) states 
of the world, which are consciously available and modifiable. However, 
episodic memories are context bound, refer to times and places, and are 
directly involved in the experience of remembering. Semantic memories on 
the other hand are context-free, the information is not normally linked to time 
and places and the access of such memories does not normally involve the 
experience of remembering. 
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Episodic memories are normally induced in experimental situations. The 
content of episodic memories is controlled in order to prevent meaningful 
processing of information. By its very nature it removes the subjects ability 
to interpret the event. Thus the experimenter is only ever examining a 
particular feature of memory for events, while autobiographical memory 
involves remembering a number of characteristics over a number of different 
situations, all of which differ from those found in laboratory settings. Conway 
(1990) has proposed that episodic memory be considered a form of 
autobiographical memory, or, the study of specific events which have been 
extensively controlled. 
A further problem in defining autobiographical memory involves the 
nature of autobiographical knowledge. While semantic and episodic memory 
are quite distinct from each other the same cannot be said for semantic and 
autobiographical memory. Some autobiographical memories can be recalled 
in the absence of any imaginal representation. For example, if asked the 
question "Do you own a house?", you may be able to answer without calling 
any specific memory to mind. Obviously this is a form of autobiographical 
knowledge - even though no image is recalled. Thus some (but not all) 
autobiographical memories involve semantic knowledge (factual 
autobiographical knowledge; Conway, 1987), while episodic memories 
clearly do not. 
Furthermore, unlike episodic memories, memories for specific 
experiences include an interpretation of the event, they can cover extended 
periods of time, and recollection of this knowledge is often months and years 
after the episodes occurred, and not minutes, hours and days after it. 
Thus with episodic memories the micro-details of an event will be 
recalled, isolated and without any meaning attached. With autobiographical 
memories a much wider range of details may be remembered, often with the 
subjects interpretation of meaning, sometimes with accompanying imagery, 
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all of which may be recalled over the long term. Such differences have led 
only the latter form of knowledge to be termed autobiographical memory 
(Conway, 1992). 
Types of Autobiographical Memory 
Brewer (1986) classified memories in terms of self-reference, proposing 
that this is what makes autobiographical memories distinctive from other 
forms of memory. Self-referenced memories can be divided into image and 
non-image based memories of single or repeated events. Brewer defines 
autobiographical memories as the memory of the knowledge of an event 
which relates to the self. He admits that without a definition of the self this 
classification becomes redundant, therefore he supplies the following 11 ... the 
self is composed of an experiencing ego, a self-schema, and an associated 
set of personal memories and autobiographical facts" (Brewer, 1986: pg27). 
He sees the ego as a conscious experiencing entity that is the focus of our 
phenomenal experience in day to day life. The term autobiographical 
memory refers then to the memory of the moment-to-moment experiences of 
the ego. 
A self-schema is described by Brewer as a cognitive structure which 
contains generic information about the self and its place in the world. This 
knowledge is believed to be organised into unconscious mental structures 
which interact with and filter incoming information. In this way it gives people 
generic (semantic) knowledge about our goals, beliefs and attitudes. 
Because of its complex nature it allows a consistency to the self over time, 
but, because of this complexity it probably changes very slowly. 
The classification system that follows from this is based on three factors: 
the presence of ego-self involvement, whether the experience occurred once 
or repeatedly, and whether the memory is image-based or not. Thus a 
personal memory is an image-based representation of a single experienced 
event. An autobiographical fact is a non-image based recollection of an 
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event that has occurred once only. A generic personal memory involves 
recalling an image of an event that occurred repeatedly. Generic personal 
memories are usually more abstract in form than that of a personal memory 
because they are assumed to contain the general features from a number of 
similar events. Lastly, a self-schema is a non-imaginal generic memory, and 
presumably represents highly abstracted personal knowledge taken from 
repeated experiences. 
Brewer's classification system helps differentiate autobiographical and 
episodic memory to the extent that episodic memories will not contain much 
ego-self involvement. Put simpler, with episodic memory the complex 
knowledge structures relating to the self do not come to bear on information 
encoded from events and retrieved from memory. 
However, there are problems with Brewer's conclusions. As Conway 
(1990) points out it may be the cue used to recall an event that determines 
the form the memory takes. Thus, whether one recalls an autobiographical 
fact or a personal memory may have less to do with the underlying nature of 
autobiographical memories than it does with the processes involved 
accessing them to consciousness. Brewer's classification system does 
however help define autobiographical knowledge from other forms of 
knowledge via self-reference. 
Autobiographical Memory, Meaning Structures, and Mental 
Representations 
The question is posed how can Autobiographical memories, as defined 
above, be conceived to relate to other forms of memory and other systems in 
the mind, and how do these structures and processes interact in information 
processing. Lundh (1995) has proposed a model of how the systems and 
processes involved in cognition and memory are related, and how they 
interact to produce cognitive experience in humans. Lundh's model can 
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help us to conceive of the relation between autobiographical memory and the 
processing of information from traumatic events. 
He refers to Meaning Structures (MS) which are cognitive-evaluational 
structures in a persons mind/brain that develop in order for people to make 
sense of their experiences of objects and events. Meaning structures are 
responsible for categorising information and for forming memory networks 
(although they are not memory networks in and of themselves). In this way 
they can be seen as responsible for imparting implicational meanings to 
events (Teasdale, 1993). Meaning structures have two functions, they serve 
as knowledge (beliefs and expectations) about reality, and secondly they 
generate a number of emotional and motivational processes such as 
ambitions, goals, values, attitudes, appraisals, and desires. It is this first 
aspect of meaning structures that has received the most attention by 
cognitive theorists while the second function of MS has tended to be ignored. 
However as Lundh (1995) argues, human knowledge and beliefs are 
inseparable from emotional and motivational factors. 
When meaning structures interact with peripheral subsystems in the 
mind (verbal, perceptual, and behavioural) they produce mental 
representations. Mental representations are that part of mental processes 
that involve thinking or imagining about things that are not externally present 
to our senses. Mental representations can be thought of as the medium of 
mental activity (Lundh, 1995), because, it is only when information is recalled 
from long-term memory into short-term or working memory that this 
information can be manipulated to produce cognitive experiences such as 
the experience of memories. 
Lundh takes an evolutionary and developmental perspective on how 
meaning structures develop. He argues that meaning structures are the 
result of genetic predisposition's and individual experience. These cognitive-
evaluational structures developed in order for people to make sense of their 
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experiences of objects and events. From the moment that organisms are 
born they will make meaningful searches of their environment in order to be 
able to recognise and approach things that possess value for them and avoid 
things that possess threat for them. 
Lundh argues that networks of memory structures developed and built up 
around biologically derived values (positive and negative). Among the 
meaning structures that develop around basic values are those that make it 
possible for an organism to predict and control the attainment of positively 
valued events and the avoidance of negatively valued events. Classical and 
operant conditioning are two ways in which these structures can develop. 
Classical (S-S) and operant (S-R-S) conditioning lead to the development of 
structures where expectations are important. Classical conditioning makes 
the world more predictable and operant conditioning makes the world more 
predictable and more controllable, because it teaches one that acting in a 
certain way will increase the probability of experiencing positive events and 
decreases the probability of experiencing negative events. 
Operant and classical conditioning depend on perception and behaviour 
but not on the existence of language. Thus pre-verbal learning will still 
result in network formation, but the meanings (threat and value) of events 
and objects are connected via the perceptual and behavioural systems to 
classes of stimuli and responses (See Figure One). 
With the acquisition of language a third system (the verbal system) 
develops. This third system reorganises already existing meaning structures 
and will result in new kinds of inter-connections among the nodes in the 
network. The pre-existing classes of objects, actions and events acquire 
links to word nodes. This results in some of the former connections between 
stimuli and responses acquiring links to verbal nodes as well as perceptual 
nodes. It also results in the "verbal system", that part of the mind that is 
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involved in producing and comprehending speech and written language, and 
in verbal and conceptual thinking about events and objects. 
PERCEPTUAL SYSTEMS 
BEHAVIOURAL SYSTEMS 
FIGURE 1. An Elementary Meaning Structure. This structure involves the 
expectations that if (S) occurs then (R) is likely to lead to (S). The shading of S 
means that it is invested with Value (Lundh, 1995. pg.370.) 
Meaning Structures and Mental Processes 
Lundh argues that mental processes involve the interaction of the CNMS 
(central network of meaning structures) and peripheral subsystems 
(behavioural, perceptual, and verbal). Storage of long-term information 
occurs in the CNMS, while encoding and retrieval of information occurs 
through interactions between the CNMS and the other systems. In the 
short-term, information is recalled from the CNMS and held in working 
memory through various memory codes. This enables people to apply 
various cognitive processes to this information and this allows the 
processing of information to occur. 
Lundh argues that the information stored in long term memory is made 
up of the meaningful interpretations of perceptual and verbal experiences. 
This means that information, encoded into and recalled from long-term 
memory, will always contain an evaluation or interpretation of a situation or 
event which originates from meaning structures. This evaluation will be 
related to factors such as the importance of the event for the self, and in 
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what way the event is/was related to goals for that individual. This is a 
higher level of meaning, or what Teasdale (1993) refers to as implicational 
meaning. 
Memory and Meaning Structures 
Lundh's is a dual-processing theory. It argues that there are two ways in 
which information from the environment and long-term memory is processed 
but that there is only one storage unit for this information (the CNMS). This 
differs from the work of Pavia (1971, 1986) who argues for two different 
long-term memory systems, the 11 imaginal 11 and the 11 verbal 11 code. However 
Pavia's theory cannot explain how we know (or relate in memory) that a 
verbal description and an image of an object refer to the same thing. The 
case for a dual processing system has been demonstrated in a number of 
studies but the evidence for duel storage systems is less sound (Marschank, 
Richman, Yuille, & Hunt, 1987; Marschank, & Surian, 1989). In fact dual 
coding of information may be a process distinction at the level of working 
memory (Lundh, 1995). 
Meaning structures will hold our episodic, semantic, procedural, 
perceptual and autobiographical memory. Lundh suggests that these forms 
of memory are differentiated by encoding and retrieval processes, but that 
they are stored in the same system in long-term memo01, the Cf\J~"~S (See 
Figure 2). 
SEMANTIC AND PERCEPTUAL MEMORY 
According to Lundh's theory semantic memory involves external 
stimuli entering the senses through the verbal system. Retrieving this 
information involves accessing information about events or objects from the 
CNMS, through the verbal system, in the form of thoughts. Perceptual 
memory involves the same process but encoding and retrieving information 
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FIGURE 2. A Schematic representation of the dual-coding theory of memory as 
proposed by Lundh (1995). Semantic and Perceptual memory function as loops 
where external stimuli that enters the senses is encoded and retrieved from the 
CNMS via the perceptual/imaginal and verbal systems (represented by two-way 
arrows). Episodic memory involves retrieval of information from both of these 
systems related to specific, concrete events. Application of self-knowledge from 
the CNMS to information accessed from memory networks results in 
Autobiographical Memory, also retrieved and encoded via perceptual and verbal 
systems. Two-way arrow from emotional system to CNMS indicates that these two 
systems can effect and initiate each other. 
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from the CNMS occurs through the perceptual subsystem in the form of 
images (See Figure Two). Because all information is stored in the same 
unit, people are able to tell that an image and a verbal report of an object 
refer to the same external stimulus. When the central network of meaning 
structures is activated by a perceptual or verbal cue the whole meaning 
structure is accessed and the knowledge of an event can be retrieved as 
either a thought or an image. According to Lundh's model it will not matter 
whether information is accessed from the central network of meaning 
structures via sensory or perceptual pathways because both forms of 
processing access the same knowledge pool (the CNMS). Thus the 
meaning accessed will be relatively independent of the information channel 
used. 
Researchers have found that pictures are more likely to be remembered 
than concrete words, and concrete words are more likely to be remembered 
than abstract words. Lundh believes that imagery improves memory 
because it results in the elaboration of the information which is input. This 
increases its relatedness to other information in the CNMS and improves the 
distinctiveness of the resultant memory trace. Events that are encoded via 
both perceptual and verbal pathways will presumably be easier to access 
because more stimuli (memory cues) will be able to activate the memory 
network. 
PROCEDURAL MEMORY AND BEHAVIOURAL SYSTEMS 
It is part of the essential nature of meaning structures that they are 
connected to behavioural (motivational) systems. Without a record of what 
the environment affords meaning would have no purpose. It is impossible to 
value something if we do not know that certain behavioural reactions will 
result in desirable and/or undesirable outcomes. Thus meaning structures 
are connected to the environment through behavioural systems. Knowing 
what the outcome of an interaction with the environment will be will depend 
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on an individuals behavioural repertoires, which will in themselves depend 
on personal learning experiences. 
Therefore Lundh (1995) argues for hierarchically organised behavioural 
systems that make use of information held in the CNMS, and that specify at 
the highest level the goal of a behaviour, and at lower levels the detailed 
movements needed to achieve this goal. The purpose of behavioural 
systems, along with procedural memory, life plans, long-term goals and 
values are to motivate individuals. The behavioural systems act then as a 
third link between the CNMS and the external world. 
Under Lundh's' model behavioural actions, coping strategies and long-
term goals are represented as nodes in the memory networks. These 
elements have connections to the behavioural systems of various strengths 
depending on the "value" of the associations (their ability to foster positive 
events and prevent the experience of negative events). These associations 
will be strengthened or weakened over time as life goals, and behavioural 
strategies change, and when new information is assimilated into the 
meaning structures. As we shall see goals (and thus a behavioural system) 
play an important role in traumatic memory formation. 
EPISODIC MEMORY AND MEANING STRUCTURES 
into memory depends on attending to perceptual and verbal stimuli, 
including thoughts, from the environment. This is presumed to activate the 
CNMS via both the perceptual/imaginal and verbal systems. In episodic 
memories this information will be encoded in terms of existing meaning 
structures, because unlike the generalisation of information that occurs in 
perceptual and semantic memory, episodic memories will be for a particular 
concrete (in the temporal sense) episode. Thus episodic memories are 
indexed by temporal factors including existing cognitive capacities and pre-
existing meaning structures. 
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To Lundh the relationship between meaning structures and episodic 
memory is circular, in that (1) events are encoded, stored, and retrieved in 
terms of existing meaning structures, and (2) new meaning structures are 
developed as the result of generalisation from a sequence of similar events. 
The encoding, storage and retrieval of episodic memories in terms of 
existing meaning structures implies that recall is a constructive, elaborative 
mental activity. Therefore how we remember an event can change over time 
as our meaning structure changes, as we come to learn new connections 
between events and consequences, and how these relate to life goals and 
other motivations. 
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY AND MEANING STRUCTURES 
According to Brewers (1986) classification system autobiographical 
memory results from the retrieval of personally significant information. As 
noted earlier, autobiographical memory is not a separate subsystem or 
memory structure but rather our memory for events that relate to the self. 
Information about the self which is applied to our experience of events is 
assumed to be held in the CNMS along with long-term goals, beliefs and 
other abstract knowledge about the self as well as goals, beliefs and life-
plans (See Figure 2.). It is assumed that this information is applied to the 
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of these factors in PTSD is related to the organisation and structure of 
autobiographical knowledge and memory stores. 
Specific autobiographical memories are reconstructed from abstract 
information stored in the CNMS and from the specific details of events. Like 
episodic memories this information is encoded into memory along current 
states or values for an individual because the memories are of specific 
events (in a temporal sense). Thus each time a memory is encoded it is 
along pre-existing beliefs and "views" of the world and self, that are assumed 
to be held in self-schemas within meaning structures. 
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Mental representations of information stored in long-term memory are 
produced by the spread of activation from the CNMS into the verbal and 
imaginal subsystems. If this information is selectively attended to it 
becomes activated at the level of working memory. During autobiographical 
memory recall self-knowledge is applied to this information in order to 
produce a mental representation. The exact nature of this information might 
include cognitive components such as (1) goals, ambitions, and ideals; (2) 
various beliefs about the self; and (3) knowledge about ones own mental 
processes and memory limitations which serve to regulate mental processes 
(Lundh, 1995). Thus meaning structures will contain both a cognitive model 
and a model of the "self" which interact with various cognitive processes and 
capacities to determine and alter the mental representation that is evoked. 
When information is activated into working memory certain operations 
are able to be applied to this information for a short period of time. These 
operations are the way in which the content of meaning structures and 
memory is altered. 
Whether one recalls a mental image of a past event or a verbal 
description of it, the "memory" will contain a certain amount of actual 
concrete perceptual and verbal information. Some memories will be highly 
concrete and rich in detail and others will be highly abstract, containing only 
the meaning of the event. Most memories however will lie along a 
continuum, somewhere in between these two extremes. What determines 
whether a memory will be abstract or concrete? This seems to be a function 
of what factors were attended to when the event occurred, and the level at 
which they were attended to. Other factors which will interact to produce 
distinct visual and verbal representations include the emotion present at the 
time of encoding, with highly emotional events producing vivid memories. 
Another important factor is that we can consciously shift the level at which 
we attend to information (Lundh, 1995). The importance of this factor for 
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information processing has been demonstrated in the work on mental control 
(Wegner, 1994), and mental contamination (Wilson & Brekke, 1994). In 
times of stress and high cognitive load such as during traumatic events and 
during re-experiencing episodes people will shift the level at which they 
attend to information and this results in skewed memory records of events 
and acts to perpetuate existing beliefs about the self and the world (See 
Chapter Two for a fuller description of these factors). 
It is important to remember that meaning structures and memory 
structures are different. Meaning structures are responsible for categorising 
and organising the kind of information that will be constructed into (and thus 
able to be retrieved from) memory networks. They do this by utilising 
information about a persons goals, desires, and beliefs, to evaluate incoming 
stimuli. Meaning structures are also responsible for processes such as 
selective attention because they contain information about peoples cognitive 
resources and abilities. As the research into autobiographical memory will 
show it is this information that is used to determine what is encoded and 
retrieved from memory structures. 
The question remains how do factors such as emotion, attention, and the 
self interact to produce specific autobiographical memories such as those 
experienced in PTSD? Research into the processes of autobiographical 
memory can help us in this regard. 
Emotions, the Self, and Autobiographical Memory 
Robinson (1980) conducted several autobiographical memory 
experiments in which subjects were given cue words which represented 
different emotions (fear, anger, surprise, happy, etc.). The subjects were 
required to recall a personal memory of an event in which the emotion of the 
cue word was present. Robinson recorded retrieval times and a number of 
other factors such as ratings of intensity and pleasantness of the memory. 
For example, a subject was given the cue word happy, and the time taken to 
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retrieve the memory was recorded. Fast retrieval times indicate that the 
memory was highly available to retrieval processes while a slow retrieval 
time indicates that the memory was less available. 
In these experiments Robinson found that intense emotions increased 
the availability of an autobiographical memory regardless of how pleasant or 
unpleasant the memory was to the subject. Robinson attributes this to the 
amount of attention and processing that intense emotions provoke towards 
accompanying events. It is also possible that these emotionally intense 
memories receive more rehearsal which makes them more available. I 
propose that these factors are important because they are indications that 
goals or motives for an individual are used in representing emotionally-
charged events in memory. 
The question remains, how do these factors (attention and rehearsal) 
make a memory more available? Work by Pillemer, Goldsmith, Panter, & 
White (1988) suggests that first time or personally relevant experiences are 
preserved in memory while subsequent similar events, which are 
unmemorable because they are not novel (or perhaps because they do not 
represent current concerns for the individual), merge into schematic 
representation. They found that the two best predictors for the clarity of 
memories were the intensity of emotion at the time of experience and 
perceived life impact at the time of experience. The clarity of the memories 
in such cases may be related to some form of privileged encoding of first 
time experiences. If meaning structures are organised to encode memories 
of first time experiences as the basis for more complex schematic 
representations in memory then these first time experiences would be 
expected to receive greater processing. 
This leaves us with the question, Why is emotion correlated with memory 
clarity and why does "experienced emotion" affect memory in such a 
fashion? It was suggested by Conway (1990) that emotional intensity and 
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life impact are important because they indicate that knowledge structures 
about the self have been used in representing the memory. A series of 
experiments by Conway (1989) found that emotion and goal-derived word 
categories (indicating current concerns for an individual) produce the highest 
amount of spontaneous autobiographical memory retrieval, while abstract 
concepts produce high levels of semantic images. These findings are 
important because they indicate different processes related to emotion, the 
self, and motivations are involved in the recall of semantic and 
autobiographical memory. As Conway (1990) has noted, emotions and the 
self are critical in determining memory content and the subsequent 
availability of such memories. Both of these factors, memory content and 
memory availability, have been implicated in re-experiencing episodes in 
PTSD (Cassiday et al, 1992; Foa et al, 1991; Zeitlan & McNally, 1991). 
Organisation of Autobiographical Memory 
Autobiographical memories constitute knowledge about events that are 
self-relevant. Lundh 1s theory of meaning structures and mental 
representations helps to conceptualise how the general knowledge from 
personally-relevant events is related to other forms of knowledge in cognitive 
structures, and how these structures act to organise information from the 
environment. What remains is to define how specific memories of events 
are organised in memory and how these memories function in traumatic 
experiences. 
STORAGE OF AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL KNOWLEDGE 
Work into the organisation of Autobiographical memory has found that 
the memories of general events may be organised in long term memory in 
the form of lifetime periods and represented by 11 thematic 11 knowledge 
abstracted from a set of associated events (Robinson, 1992). This thematic 
knowledge is assumed to be organised around specific memories which are 
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related to experiences which convey information abut the attainment or loss 
of goals of the self. As already noted first-time experiences often act in this 
way because they convey information about the attainment or loss of 
personally significant goals or beliefs (Robinson, 1992). 
Anderson and Conway (1993) studied the organisation of general 
memory for specific episodes, and they propose that autobiographical 
knowledge is hierarchically organised. They found that while the details of 
specific events may be organised in memory in a forward temporal order 
(the manner in which they were encoded), they are accessed via thematic 
knowledge structures that are themselves organised into the distinctive 
details of events. Thus an individuals life themes will access memories of 
general events that give them information about these themes, and these 
general events index the specific details of a particular event. These 
general events can be composed of a set of associated events or a single 
event that relates to a particular theme. 
The individual memories of events that are retained in memory tend to 
convey information about goal-attainment (positive and negative) that is 
significant for the self (such as success or failure to perform as expected in a 
situation)(Conway, 1995). Such expectancy-consistent information 
processing may also be responsible for increasing or decreasing the 
likelihood of developing PTSD and is indexed by automatic information 
processing such as an inability to suppress unwanted thoughts and images 
(intrusions). 
Robinson (1992) has suggested that memories of first-time experiences 
form a particular category of general events that are important in determining 
the self because they convey information about success or failure that is 
likely to affect performance in other similar events in the future and because 
future similar experiences will be indexed under the same theme in memory. 
It is this information that will be used to evaluate performance in similar 
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situations in the future. It follows from this that specific memories held in 
long-term memory gives us information that can be used to avoid or predict 
success and failure (to attain positively valued experiences and avoid 
negatively valued experiences) in the future. In PTSD the traumatic event or 
events will be organised into a thematic structure that represents novel or 
personally significant information about the attainment or loss of a goal in 
that situation. 
The specific details of autobiographical memory are termed event 
specific knowledge (ESK) and they are assumed to be represented in 
memory at the lowest level. It has even been proposed that event specific 
knowledge may be represented in a separate memory store from general 
and thematic knowledge (Conway, 1995). It has also been proposed that 
thematic knowledge forms part of a general all-purpose memory structure (a 
meaning structure) that is used for various cognitive processes where 
general information about the self is required (Anderson and Conway, 1993). 
In this way thematic and general information about a persons past 
experiences with fearful situations will be represented in meaning structures. 
Such information about past selves held in an abstract form in meaning 
structures will be able to be used to "customise" other knowledge, in 
particular semantic knowledge (Conway, 1990). It is this information which 
is used to categorise information from events and is responsible for skewing 
a memory network towards threat. We can only encode into memory what 
we attended to in the first place. In stressful situations people attend to 
those factors related to goal-states. Thus the content of a memory is 
dependent on the information used to interpret the situation. Perceiving a 
situation as threatening involves activating perceptions of threat held in 
meaning structures. 
If thematic and general autobiographical knowledge forms a separate 
memory store from ESK then this can help to explain the retrieval of 
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overgeneral memory in PTSD patients for all events except the traumatic 
ones. Overgeneral memory occurs when subjects are required to recall a 
specific memory to a cue word. If they recall a general event instead of a 
specific event then they are said to have overgeneral memory. In PTSD 
patients overgeneral memory has been observed for personal information 
not related to the trauma (McNally et al, 1994). If the general and thematic 
knowledge of these events is held in a separate pool from ESK and thematic 
knowledge is able to be accessed, but recall or access of the ESK pool is 
prevented by some means, then only general events will be able to be 
recalled and not the specific details of these events. We shall investigate in 
the next section attentional factors that could be responsible for overgeneral 
memory. 
When the micro-details of events are recalled they tend to be associated 
with sensory information, vivid images, affect, and sometimes a distinctive 
11 fact 11 • While the existence of a separate memory store for ESK is still 
unproved, it does concur with findings from implicit memory research that 
indicates that the event specific knowledge of events may be related to pre-
semantic perceptual memory systems like those proposed by Lundh (1995} 
(Tulving & Schacter, 1990}. It has been shown that implicit memory (a form 
of automatic information processing) of highly specific sensory knowledge 
can be retained, and, can influence subsequent behaviour (Schacter, 1987). 
Thus traumatic information, for example, in the form of specific sensory 
knowledge can influence behaviour without having to be consciously 
recalled from long-term memory. Presumably it acts to filter what 
information is encoded from the environment by priming cognitive states of 
arousal that act to focus attention in stressful situations in order to encode 
into memory those facets of the situation that convey information that is 
consistent with goals or life-plans. In the case of traumatic events this is 
likely to be information about the presence and nature of threat. 
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LIFE THEMES AND ENCODING AND RETRIEVAL FACTORS 
Life themes (which are responsible for accessing more specific 
autobiographical memories) are related to the self and influence and are 
partially responsible for the occurrence of emotions. 
One view on how these themes arise comes from Conway (1992) who 
proposes that at any one time we are motivated by a set of plans which 
reflect current concerns for the individual. Themes emerge from disparities 
between current self concepts and some desired or feared self (Higgins, 
1987). This self-system is responsible for imparting meaning to events and 
thus produces emotional reactions to the perceived impact of life events. 
According to this theory emotions occur at the places where goals are 
achieved or frustrated. This necessitates the access of abstract (life-goal) 
information about the self, or as Teasdale (1993) conceives of it implicational 
levels of meaning, in order to produce emotions to events or the memories 
of evenis. 
Lazarus (1991) proposes that emotions are the result of appraisals of 
situations that indicate the frustration or attainment of goals. Appraisal 
involves evaluating the personal significance of an encounter with the 
environment. He proposes that different emotions are generated by specific 
patterns of appraisal. Our display of an emotion will depend on the meaning 
that we derive from a situation and different emotions will prime or initiate 
specific action plans to deal with that state. We have pre-emotion (sensory) 
states in which we perceive situations as threatening or beneficial. It is only 
after this appraisal process has occurred that an emotion is evoked. Thus 
when we perceive a situation as personally significant (because it indicates 
that a self-goal has been achieved or thwarted) then an emotional 
experience to that object or event will occur. 
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However, a theory that emotions result from appraisals of situations 
necessitates the proposal of a plan or action sequence for the individual. 
Without knowing what we expect to normally happen in a situation we cannot 
know that a goal has been thwarted or achieved. Oatley (1992) has 
proposed a plan based theory of emotion that posits that specific plans in 
situations consist of a goal (or goals), a set of preconditions for activating the 
goal, a set of actions for when goals are met or frustrated, and a set of 
effects. According to Lundh (1995) these behavioural plans make use of 
information in the CNMS and are organised hierarchically. Under Oatley's 
theory when an emotion occurs it represents to the individual a need to re-
evaluate plans and the action plan is responsible for initiating alternative 
strategies to meet current goals. 
In a personally significant event self-discrepancies (or themes) will 
determine what information is encoded, and when current self-discrepancies 
are no longer active these experiences will be represented by the memories 
of these events (Conway, 1995). Thus the cues that elicit the most 
memories from a life period will be the ones that access former self-
discrepancies for that individual. 
One might argue that memory networks contain nodes for the 
perception of emotions but that the emotions themselves result from the 
application of motivational information and higher level meanings (Teasdale, 
1993). Thus a memory of a traumatic experience will only develop into a fear 
memory network after the situation referenced by the memory is perceived to 
be threatening (in that it has thwarted a goal or plan for the individual). This 
could occur immediately after the traumatic event or some time later, but it 
will always be dependant on a perception of threat resulting from the 
frustration or threat of a life-goal. This life-goal could be related to individual 
survival or some other factor such as ones belief in their competence on 
stressful situations. 
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Lazarus (1991) argues that the direction of the behavioural flow 
between cognition and emotion goes both ways. Thus while emotion is a 
response to meaning, it can also produce or influence subsequent thoughts 
and emotions. So, while fear will result from the application of abstract 
information about the self and the world to a situation, it will also result in the 
activation of cognition's (images and thoughts) related to that fear. While 
automatic thoughts will activate fear, fear activates and acts to maintain 
negative thoughts by activating traumatic memory structures. This cycle of 
information processing "proves" to the individual that negative thoughts are 
correct, even though they are based on a biased perception of a situation. A 
person is unable to perceive their thinking as biased because information 
from situations is automatically processed using information contained in 
meaning structures which is unconscious and thus not usually subject to 
evaluation. 
Life themes develop in response to existential problems for the individual 
(Conway, 1995). The importance of earlier themes (and thus memories) in 
later life depends upon how problems and solutions are conceptualised, 
because this conceptualisation remains in memory and can effect behaviour 
in later life (Conway, 1995). Life-themes occur in traumatised and non-
traumatised individuals and will be related to the current concerns for that 
individual at the time of encoding (Reimann & McNally, 1995). 
When faced with a life problem, in instances of goal frustration, (termed a 
lifetime period-specific problem, Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1985) a person will 
selectively allocate resources. When faced with a number of competing 
goals (in periods of transition or high stress) people allocate problem-solving 
resources. People do this, according to Markus & Nurius (1986), because 
they are attempting to attain a number of "possible selves", and this is 
achieved through developing and applying behaviour-oriented plans that 
contain sub-goal structures. It is through this network of currently active 
68 
themes of the self that knowledge of specific events are encoded. This 
forms the thematic structure of the autobiographical memory (knowledge) 
base. Thus autobiographical memories of traumatic experiences can be 
thought of as a record of past selves. The specific verbal and perceptual 
details of peoples experiences will be represented as specific memories 
such as those proposed by semantic memory networks. The more 
abstracted form of this knowledge is held in meaning structures. 
Autobiographical Memory and Trauma 
Autobiographical memories and thus trauma-related representations are 
constructed from the autobiographical knowledge base. The research into 
PTSD and memory indicates that there are cognitive representations of 
threat in people with PTSD that are chronically accessible. Thus there is a 
need to investigate how these "memories" are accessed to consciousness 
and how they result in intrusions. 
RETRIEVAL FACTORS 
Williams & Hollan (1981) proposed that memories are accessed via a 
"cyclic" retrieval process. First a cue is elaborated into a memory 
description. Then this memory description is used to search long-term 
memory stores. Any and all knowledge accessed by this process is 
evaluated, and a decision is made on whether to terminate the memory 
search. Termination of the search will occur when the desired memory is 
found, but this may take several "cycles" of search and evaluation. A 
memory is conceived of as all the information accessed from this retrieval 
process (Collin & Loftus, 1975), and memories often contain themes, 
general events, and event specific details. 
The evaluation stage of the retrieval process acts to maintain and 
terminate (or inhibit) activation of the memory structure. Norman & Shallice 
(1980) and Shallice (1988) propose that the S.A.S (supervisory attentional 
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system) is responsible for this function. The SAS acts to modulate 
automatic processes involved in memory functioning and is similar to the 
proposal by Wegner (1994) of "mental control" which is a two-step process 
that acts to inhibit or suppress unwanted thoughts by searching for and 
substituting appropriate for inappropriate thoughts. This presumably occurs 
via a system such as the SAS . 
The SAS is assumed to have access to information from the environment 
and to the cognitive system which includes information about cognitive 
capabilities and behavioural intentions (See also Lundh (1995) on the 
cognitive regulatory function of meaning structures, page 55 this work). The 
SAS would incorporate current self concepts, active themes, and goals and 
plans of the self. In this way the SAS is able to construct "mental models" of 
the world that act to constrain memory functioning. The SAS acts to 
elaborate cues into memory descriptions. It is able to do this because it 
accesses information related to current self-concepts and goals. With this 
information it forms a mental model which is used to search the 
autobiographical knowledge structure. This searching process occurs 
automatically to access life periods. A spread of activation occurs to 
progressively more specific details of an event. Because the SAS is 
accessing information related to current self-concepts and goals it will 
influence the kind of information that is activated from memory and may also 
effect the elaboration phase of memory recall (Conway, 1995). 
Because self-concepts give meaning to memories when our self-
concepts and goals change or when a life-goal is frustrated then the 
meaningfulness of events related to this goal or self-concept will also 
change. In this way events that were once considered important will no 
longer seem so while other events which did not seem important at the time 
they were encoded will take on new meaning. This statement offers us a 
way to conceive of delayed reactions in PTSD. As Foa et al (1989) 
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proposed delayed reactions to trauma develop when memory structures 
acquire a meaning about the presence of threat in a situation. Foa et al 
suggest that gaining new information about a traumatic event can result in a 
delayed reaction. According to this theory such an acquired meaning would 
involve information about the frustration of a life goal whether it be individual 
survival or some other goal related to ones view of the self or the world. 
Only after a goal-state is frustrated or achieved will the memory of an event 
come to be related to a perception of threat. 
There are certain factors which are important in determining the kind of 
memory that we recall when presented with cues. Because our memories 
are hierarchically organised (themes - general events - event specific 
knowledge) once a memory description has accessed a theme then the 
memories able to be recalled will be limited to events indexed by that theme. 
Thus if a memory description accesses the 'trauma-related' theme, then 
recall of memories will be confined to events related to that theme. As well 
as the cue used to recall a memory, the self-concept and goals that are 
active at the time of retrieval will determine what information is recalled from 
memory. Because self-concepts determine memory descriptions and the 
evaluation stage of memory retrieval, self-concepts will determine memory 
content. If a person is focused on cues (including emotions) that index or 
access traumatic memory themes then other memories from other life 
themes will be difficult to access. In the case of PTSD this may lead to an 
increase in intrusive material and/or an overgeneral memory for non-
traumatic events. 
Thus the material recalled from memory after a traumatic event will be 
the information that is accessed by the cues present in the environment 
when these cues are elaborated into memory descriptions based on current 
self-concepts and goals for the individual. In this way retrieval of traumatic 
material is seen to be modulated by central control processes (Conway, 
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1995). The pattern of memory activation will be a memory along with the 
constraints on the memory-retrieval process. 
PROCESSING INFORMATION FROM LTM 
Memory construction as outlined above makes large demands on 
processing resources. Conway (1995) proposes that the construction of 
autobiographical memories occurs "in the background" and that memories 
will only emerge into conscious awareness when appropriate or when other 
current cognitive tasks are completed. Thus autobiographical memories 
may be constantly activated in some form, particularly those memories that 
relate to current concerns for the individual. In the case of PTSD memories 
of the traumatic event will become activated if they are perceived as 
important to a goal for the individual. Furthermore they will become 
chronically activated if the individual is unable to suppress these images or 
thoughts. In this way a persons perception of threat is a better indicator of 
whether or not PTSD will develop because it is an indication of an active 
concern or motive. It follows from this that intrusive material would stop, not 
simply because there is nothing left to learn from the reminders of the event 
(Epstein, 1990), but because intrusive material no longer represents a 
persons current concerns. The intrusive memories no longer act to indicate 
goal-frustration to the individual experiencing them. An implication of this 
statement is that therapy that serves to change implicational as well as 
propositional meanings should also result in the extinction of fear and a 
decrease in intrusive material in PTSD, and may represent a better form of 
therapy than that which serves to alter only the explicit propositional 
meanings of the memory network. As long as a person holds negative 
views of their self and the world that act to construct memories of events in a 
negative way the reminders of these events will remain as intrusive and 
maladaptive. Coming to new conclusions about the implications of the 
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trauma for ones self-concept will decrease the importance of the 
accompanying memories because they act to disengage those memories 
from negative goal states whose purpose is to filter and classify information. 
ENCODING FACTORS 
It may be that the processes involved in retrieval of memories are also 
involved in the encoding of memories (Conway, 1995). In this way 
encoding would occur in a cyclic fashion. According to this view the first 
step in encoding traumatic memories is the access of knowledge from long-
term memory in order to make a description of the to-be-encoded event 
(TBE). The TBE knowledge has to be encoded and assimilated into pre-
existing knowledge structures, otherwise it cannot be recalled at a future 
time. Thus integrating information into long-term memory would be an 
essential facet of encoding. 
Conway (1995) argues that encoding consists of a number of component 
processes. First the experience is segmented and represented in memory 
by the general event structure that it represents. Only then is this 
information (which has already been processed to some extent) integrated 
with long-term memory stores. A study by Conway, Anderson, Larsen, 
McDaniel, McClelland, Rawles, and Logie (1994) of flashbulb and 
nonf!ashbu!b memories has found that factors such as prior knowledge, 
personal importance, and affect act together in flashbulb memories (highly 
self-important memories) to rapidly integrate self-relevant events into long-
term memory. This makes these events more complete in terms of the 
details of the events. The integration and consolidation of this information 
into long-term memory stores will continue after the event terminates. 
Accessing this memory structure into working memory will serve to fix the 
parameters of the memory in long-term memory. In this way information 
from traumatic events can be said to have been processed before it 
eventuates in re-experiencing episodes. Intrusive memories in PTSD result 
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from the chronic activation of this representation from memory in a way that 
acts to increase the level of intrusions (Wegner, 1995) 
Cognitive shortcuts in the form of automatic thoughts which are used 
to cut down processing requirements in times of high cognitive load (Wilson 
& Brekke, 1994) will interact with the factors mentioned above to determine 
what information is encoded from events. This includes selective attention 
to stimuli in an environment, and selective exposure and selective 
interpretation of situations and performance. These factors can combine in 
the encoding of traumatic events to result in biased records of events in an 
expectancy-consistent fashion. 
People often ask why memories of traumatic events are so vivid. In 
recollecting autobiographical memories the experience of remembering is 
assumed to arise from the nature of information that is accessed when 
constructing a memory. Memories will seem more intense and vivid when 
there is more event specific details about that event present in a memory. 
The presence of and ability to recall event specific knowledge is dependent 
on cues held at the general-event level (Conway, 1995). Difficulty in 
retrieving event specific knowledge for non-traumatic events ( overgeneral 
memory) has been proposed as being related to emotional numbing in 
PTSD (McNally et al, 1994). Event specific details may give people the 
feeling that they experienced events rather than simply remembered them 
(as in when we remember stories about ourselves that were told to us by 
others)(Conway, 1995). If event specific knowledge cannot be accessed 
then these generalised memories of non-traumatic experiences will not 
convey the same kind of information to the self that the experience of 
remembering does. If you do not feel personally involved in your own 
memories then your experience of these memories will be emotionally 
absent or 11 numb 11 • Consequently the negative memories of the trauma, 
which are high in sensory detail, will seem more real and the experiences 
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and beliefs associated with these memories will seem more salient to the 
self. If the traumatic memory conveys information that one failed to perform 
as expected or required (goal frustration) then the memories of the trauma 
will convey negative information about the self and the world. Such 
meanings and evaluations of behaviour could restrict a persons recall of 
coping strategies by preventing access to other less-emotionally charged 
life-periods and the accompanying memories, behaviour strategies and 
beliefs of the self. This process would perpetuate current negative views of 
the self and the world. 
From the current research and theory into autobiographical memory 
organisation there appears to be two processes that mediate memory 
consolidation and integration into L TM. One set of processes help to 
segment the experience into action sequences and general events on the 
basis of personally salient event features. The second set of processes act 
to integrate the general-event structure with knowledge structures in the 
autobiographical knowledge base. These processes will occur rapidly for 
events considered personally important. Integration of information into the 
lifetime period - general event structure outlined earlier occurs slowly. 
Because knowledge is only selectively attended to and thus selectively 
encoded the retrieval of event knowledge will be selective as well. We can 
only recall the features of events that were encoded in the first place. 
However, because retrieval of autobiographical memories involves utilising 
self-concepts and goals, and because memory retrieval is constructive, the 
meaning present at the time of encoding can be altered at the time of 
retrieval. In the case of PTSD this can produce delayed reactions to 
traumatic experiences but it also allows people to consider alternate 
evaluations of situations. 
The question remains how do the memories of traumatic experiences 
come to be chronically activated in memory. This appears to be related in 
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part to the organisation of autobiographical memory. Meaning structures 
which hold abstract information about the self and about cognitive capacities 
act in times of high stress and emotion to cut down processing requirements. 
This results in selective attention to variables in traumatic situations and in 
situations that resemble the traumatic stressor. Perceiving a situation and/or 
ones reaction to this situation as threatening results in an attempt to avoid or 
suppress unwanted thoughts, emotions and memories. However as Wegner 
(1994) has shown in times of high cognitive load suppression of unwanted 
thoughts is more likely to fail. This results in an increase in intrusive material 
because the traumatic memories are primed for recall during the first stage 
of suppression of unwanted thoughts (the monitoring stage). This is a form 
of automatic information processing that makes the traumatic memory 
structure chronically accessible. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
PTSD is classified in the DSM-IV as an anxiety disorder and involves the 
experience of a traumatic, life or self-threatening event. The symptoms of 
PTSD include re-experiencing the traumatic event, avoiding reminders of the 
event, emotional numbing, and hyperarousal. Research is beginning to look 
at the role of memory in the disorder. These studies have been reviewed in 
Chapter One. The main findings are that PTSD involves an attentional bias 
to threat-relevant information that may be related to the current concerns (or 
goals) of the individual. This threat representation interferes with 
performance on other cognitive tasks, is chronically accessible and is 
assumed to be responsible for the intrusive episodes observed in PTSD. As 
well as an attentional bias PTSD is characterised by an overgeneral memory 
for other non-traumatic memories. Overgeneral memory has been 
implicated in depression and may result in the emotional numbing observed 
in PTSD. These studies raise several important questions of a theoretical 
orientation. First how do the intrusive episodes in PTSD develop and how 
are they maintained. Secondly what is the role of autobiographical memory 
(our memory for seif-reievant events) in the deveiopment and maintenance 
of PTSD. And thirdly what is the role of motivations and goals in the 
development and maintenance of PTSD. This study set out to find answers 
to these questions by evaluating information processing theories of PTSD. 
In recent years theorists have focused on information processing 
variables in the etiology and maintenance of Post-traumatic Stress Disorder. 
Information processing theorists propose that distortions in the way in which 
traumatic emotionally-charged information is processed are responsible for 
the development and maintenance of PTSD. The second chapter of this 
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thesis evaluated theories of information processing in terms of how they 
could account for memory variables. The study of information processing 
theories concludes that while many of the information processing theories of 
PTSD presented here implicitly rely on concepts related to autobiographical 
memory they do not explicitly attempt to account for the processes and 
structures that are responsible for the encoding, storage, and retrieval of 
traumatic memories except in the most vague sense. For example Horowitz 
(1976) talks of traumatic material being held in an "active state in memory". 
He does not explain this statement or the process(es) that determine how 
information is encoded, stored and retrieved from this structure. Foa et al 
(1989) and Creamer et al (1992) utilise semantic memory networks to 
explain the encoding, storage and retrieval of traumatic material, however as 
Teasdale (1993) has pointed out 11 propositional 11 semantic memory networks 
have a number of problems explaining the relation between emotion and 
memory networks. Teasdale argues that the activation of an implicational 
level of meaning is responsible for affect-related biases in information 
processing observed in PTSD, and not propositional constructs as semantic 
memory network theories posit. Jones and Barlow (1990) take a different 
but related view of PTSD. They argue that once a person has experienced a 
traumatic event ruminating about the potential threat in other similar 
situations (anxious apprehension and attentional narrowing) is a necessary 
condition for the development of PTSD. The work by Wegner (1994) into 
mental control gives us a way to perceive how cognitive processing factors 
are involved in increasing intrusive episodes in PTSD. If intrusions are 
perceived as 'wrong' or inconsistent with the goals of the individual, then an 
attempt to avoid or suppress intrusions could lead to an increase in the 
overall level of intrusions. The findings by Wilson and Brekke (1994) on the 
role of mental contamination in information processing were also considered. 
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It was concluded from this evaluation of theories that in order to explain 
the role of motivations, self concepts, and emotions in processing the 
information from traumatic events it is necessary to turn to the work on the 
research and theory in Autobiographical memory. It was contended that a 
theory of PTSD based on information processing variables needs to explain 
or at the very least take into consideration the encoding, storage, and 
retrieval of traumatic information in memory and to consider how this 
information interacts with other factors such as motivations, emotions and 
self-concepts to produce these memory records and presumably the 
symptoms of PTSD. 
A summary of the research and findings of the work into 
Autobiographical Memory and its relation to PTSD considered in Chapter 
Three is presented below. Autobiographical memory is considered a form 
(but not a separate form) of memory, and has been termed by Brewer (1986) 
as the memory for the knowledge of an event that relates to the self. Work 
by Lundh (1995) into the structure of cognitive processes in humans shows 
that Autobiographical memories along with other forms of memory are 
dependant on information held in an abstract form in meaning structures, 
and on the specific details of events held in memory networks. According to 
Lundh's theory information about traumatic events enters the senses via the 
perceptual and verbal subsystems into the central network of meaning 
structures (CNMS)(Lundh, 1995). It is then that various processes are 
carried out on this information in order for it to be encoded into long-term 
memory. Encoding occurs when information from the environment is 
attended to at the level of working memory. Stimuli will be attended to if the 
accompanying event represents information to the self about the attainment 
or loss of a goal. Information contained in meaning structures which is used 
in the process of encoding includes information about the self, information 
about the goals and beliefs of the individual, and information about the 
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cognitive capacities of the individual which serve to regulate information 
processing. This information is utilised by a system such as the S.A.S 
(supervisory attentional system) (Norman and Shallice, 1980; Shallice, 1988) 
in order to break down the event and represent it in long-term memory. 
Events are segmented and represented in memory by the general event 
structure that they represent. Affecting this process to determine the kind of 
information that is encoded from events are factors such as the emotional 
content of the event, and how the event relates to the current goals and 
beliefs of the individual. Work by Wilson and Brekke (1994) has shown that 
under stress and high cognitive load automatic information assimilation 
processes come into force that encode the cues from events which are 
consistent with the individuals expectations and pre-existing beliefs to the 
detriment of other cues. Information about events held at the general event 
level are then integrated and consolidated into long-term memory stores 
(Conway, 1995). 
This process results in a 11 memory11 of the traumatic event which is 
skewed in an expectancy-consistent manner (Creamer, 1993). This biased 
record of the event will contain information relating to the self, one's 
behaviour in that situation and an interpretation or evaluation of these 
factors. The evaluation of an event arises from information contained in 
meaning structures (implicational meanings, Teasdale, 1993) and applied to 
the event during the encoding stage of memory formation. 
This representation of the traumatic event is retained in memory under 
whatever theme it represents to the individual (Conway, 1992). The memory 
of the event will be positive if it confirms beliefs about the world and the self 
that are favourable to desired goals or it will be negative if it confirms 
unfavourable views of the self and the world. It will also be negative if it 
disconfirms previously held beliefs about the world and/or the self that were 
favourable to the goals of that individual. 
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Retrieval of traumatic material is also the responsibility of the S.A.S 
(Williams & Hollan, 1981 ). When presented with a cue from the 
environment, the S.A.S uses information contained in meaning structures to 
construct a mental representation of the traumatic event. This mental 
representation is the result of an elaboration of a cue into a memory 
description. Evaluation of memories and termination of the memory search 
are also the responsibility of the S.A.S. This process occurs automatically to 
retrieve thoughts and images of a personal nature. 
Teasdale (1993) noted that there are two kinds of information 
processing; automatic and controlled information processing. Because 
information from a traumatic event is selectively attended to and thus 
selectively encoded, retrieval of this material is selective as well. This 
enables the meaning of an event to change. Because memory retrieval is 
constructive, the meaning present at the time of encoding can be altered at 
the time of retrieval if the individual is presented with new information about 
the event that relates to goals for that individual, or if an individuals goals 
and/or beliefs change. 
In the case of intrusive episodes in PTSD when the intrusions and 
associated emotional reactions begin (they indicate to the individual the 
frustration of a goal and the need to re-evaluate the situation) some people 
will employ avoidance reactions. Using avoidance strategies will be more 
likely if these strategies have been used in the past because they are more 
likely to be accessed via the process of mental contamination (Wilson & 
Brekke, 1994). 
By attempting to control or avoid re-experiencing, PTSD sufferers may 
actually be priming recall of this negatively biased information. Once 
avoidance begins to be used as a coping strategy for reducing intrusive 
material a feedback loop is created where narrowing of attention to facets of 
situations that indicate threat combines with hyperarousal to activate the 
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S.A.S (or some similar system). This system acts to identify unwanted 
thoughts and to substitute them with more appropriate goal-consistent 
thoughts or images. If the substitution phase of mental control fails then 
these primed unwanted "memories" which have been accessed from long-
term into working memory are more likely to accessed to consciousness 
(Wegner, 1994). 
A factor which would contribute to make the failure of suppression more 
likely is the inability to access other non-traumatic representations from 
memory. The studies of overgeneral memory in PTSD patients indicate that 
once a person is exposed to disorder-specific information non-traumatic 
memories are harder to access (McNally et al, 1994). Because of the 
organisation of Autobiographical Memory (Conway, 1995), once a life theme 
has been accessed, recall of memories is limited to events that are indexed 
by that life theme. Thus once a memory cue is elaborated into a memory 
description by the S.A.S (in terms of a fearful situation the memory cue 
would be related in some way to the traumatic event) recall of non-traumatic 
memories to working memory is less likely. This "cycle" of information 
processing is likely to prevent recall of alternative coping strategies and 
other information about performance that non-traumatic autobiographical 
memories contain. An inability to recall the specific details of these 
memories makes them seem less real to the self and less salient to the 
situation one is confronted with (Conway, 1995). With only the information 
contained in biased memory records with which to judge situations and with 
only the coping strategies used in this situation with which to act, behaviour 
will seem stereotyped and emotional reactions towards non-traumatic 
memories of events may appear numbed or absent. 
It was not the aim of this thesis to try to explain all facets of PTSD as a 
disorder according to the role of memory, emotion, the self, and/or individual 
motives. Rather it was an attempt to highlight the importance of 
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Autobiographical memory processes for information processing theories of 
PTSD. A major problem for theory in this area is that at the present 
relatively little is known about the functioning of autobiographical memory 
and even less is known about the role of motives, emotions, and the self in 
these processes. Despite the lack of knowledge in this area the importance 
of Autobiographical memory features for determining information processing 
in PTSD is undeniable. In particular the role of motives, emotions, and 
behavioural subsystems in traumatic memory formation needs to be 
addressed by research. At present the link between these variables is at 
best theoretical as the research in Chapter One indicates. 
The work presented here would suggest a move away from the sole use 
of network theories to explain the processing of information in PTSD. The 
use of Teasdale's (1993) work and the work of Lundh (1995) indicates that 
while schema theories and representational theories of the mind are 
important in processing factors, there is also a need to emphasise the 
evaluational aspects of memory formation (higher level implicational 
meanings) which are used to filter experiences. As long as these negative 
implicational evaluations remain, they will be accessed in times of high 
stress to prime negative memory networks. Research and therapy must 
address the role of implicational meanings in forming intrusions in PTSD as 
well as the propositional relations of memory networks. Likewise there 
appears to be a need to apply appraisal theories of emotion (such as 
Lazarus, 1991) to PTSD in order to account for the role of motives in the 
encoding, storage, and retrieval of traumatic memories. By applying the 
research and theory of memory to PTSD a better understanding of the 
symptoms, the development and the maintenance of PTSD is possible. 
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